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ABSTRACT
This study attempted to delineate the conditions which
are necessary for fait accompli events to affect dissonance
or dissonance reduction. To this end, female subjects made
either final or tentative decisions which either were sup-
ported or not supported, with or without hindsight. (Hind-
sight is a belief that one was aware, or should have been
aware, of the information contained in the fait accompli
event even before it occurred.) The favorability of the
fait accompli event, the finality of the subject's decision,
and hindsight, were experimentally manipulated.
In general, favorability of the fait accompli event had
consistent effects. Subjects who received support for their
decision evaluated their chosen alternative more favorably
and their nonchosen alternative less favorably than subjects
who did not receive support. The analysis showed few con-
sistent effects of manipulated hindsight. Therefore, the
data were analyzed for subjects 1 acknowledged hindsight.
Although not supporting the hypotheses, the results of this
analysis indicated that hindsight had differential effects
for subjects making tentative decisions. In addition, it
was found that when the fait accompli event was favorable,
high hindsight subjects reported larger evaluative differences
between their chosen and nonchosen candidates than did sub-
jects with low hindsight. And when the fait accompli event
xi
was unfavorable, high hindsight subjects evaluated the can-
didates about equally favorably, while low hindsight sub-
jects evaluated their nonchosen candidate more favorably
than their chosen candidate. There was also evidence that
hindsight had delayed effects on subjects in final decision
conditions. Moreover, there was greater dissonance reduction
by subjects in final decision conditions than in tentative
decision conditions only for low hindsight treatment groups.
Some of these results are interpreted as being consistent
with dissonance theory. However, the theory does not ad-
equately handle the effects of favorable events. And the
dissonance-reducing processes appear not to operate when
subjects have too much commitment and responsibility. The
need for a broader theory is also discussed.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In their reanalysis of cognitive dissonance theory Brehm
and Cohen (1962) hypothesized that situations involving choice
are sufficient to arouse dissonance. One area of research
growing out of their proposition concerns the time at which
events relevant to the decision become known to the decision
maker. A number of studies have supported dissonance predic-
tions when all events are foreseeable at the time a person
makes a decision. The issue has been raised, however, about
what effect fait accompli events—events unforeseen at the
time of decision—have on the arousal of dissonance.
Within the empirical literature, fait accompli events
have either been unexpected consequences of decisions (e.g.,
Brehm and Jones, 1970) and of other behavior (e.g., Preedman,
1963), or information pertinent to an evaluation which is
unknown and withheld until after an evaluation has been made
(e.g., Walster and Prestholdt, 1966). Researchers have focused
on the traditional dissonance variables of commitment and
choice in an attempt to determine when fait accompli events
affect the level of dissonance. These efforts, however, have
turned up somewhat inconclusive evidence. For example, Sherman
(1970) concluded that an unexpected negative consequence af-
fects dissonance arousal only when dissonance has previously
been aroused. Brehm and Jones (1970), however, failed to sup-
port this position. In approaching this controversy, am the
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fait accompli issue in general, the present paper explores
both the favorability of fait accompli events, and the degree
to which they seem by, hindsight to have been foreseeable.
Unfavorable. Fait Accompl i Events
It is sometimes the case that people who experience un-
favorable, fait accompli events feel they should have been
able to anticipate them ("By hindsight I realize that I should
have known this oar had a bad transmission"). But often
there is a basis for concluding that one is not accountable
for overlooking cues that presaged the occurrence of the fait
accompli events ("The mechanic said only a well trained per-
son like himself would have noticed the subtle signs indicat-
ing that the car was a lemon" )
.
The point of view to be argued here is that the research
showing the effectiveness of unfavorable, fait accompli events
on the level of dissonance has always made the unexpected
event foreseeable by hindsight. Experiments failing to reject
the null hypothesis have offered little opportunity for this
type of foreseeabillty. Somewhat similar approaches have been
taken by Kelley (1967) and Carlsmith and Preedman (1968).
Before considering the empirical work, we should determine
why foreseeability by hindsight plays an important role when
unfavorable events are introduced fait accompli . Such an event
is likely to stimulate a search process during which the in-
dividual attempts to determine, among other things, whether he
oould have acted more shrewdly. If he feels that he could
3have foreseen these unfavorable elements of the chosen altern-
ative by hindsight, he should feel responsible for the error.
Cooper (1971), in fact, has recently shown that when an indi-
vidual feels responsible for an unfavorable event, dissonance
is aroused* Responsibility is operationalized in the Cooper
study by allowing a person to foresee the consequences of his
decision. Thus, it makes sense to argue that to the extent a
person can foresee the postdecisional , unfavorable event by
hindsight, responsibility for the error is elicited and dis-
sonance is increased. In other words, an individual experi-
ences dissonance after a decision partially because of the
existence of unfavorable elements of the chosen alternative.
Unfavorable, fait accompli events make such unfavorable
elements more salient. In addition, hindsight holds an indi-
vidual responsible for knowing about these events when the
decision was reached; this feeling of responsibility ( W I
should have known I was making an error") increases dissonance.
Typically increased dissonance reduction is shown when the
value of the chosen alternative is augmented, and/or the value
of the rejected alternative is diminished.
People, however, should be reluctant to augment dimensions
of the chosen alternative which are the subject matter of the
unfavorable event. As Festinger (1957) has argued, and Walster,
Berscheid, and Barclay (1967) have demonstrated, the extent to
which a person uses a mode of reduction is dependent upon
what
the "reality" is for the cognitive element. Most
previous re-
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search has not been sensitive to this issue because the chosen
alternative was not unfavorably evaluated fait accompli .
A person who experiences an unfavorable, fait accompli
event without hindsight (i.e., without feeling he should have
anticipated the event) should not feel added dissonance. In-
stead, he should be inclined to revoke his decision, or suffer
regret. That is, the value of the chosen alternative should
be diminished, and/or the value of the rejected alternative
should be augmented. This pattern of response is likely
because an individual need not feel at all defensive about his
improper decision. After all, there was no way he could have
been expected to anticipate this unfavorable event.
The research on fait accompli events stems from an impli-
cation of the selective exposure hypothesis as originally
proposed by Pestinger (1957). Although it has been concluded
that people do not always avoid information which could lead
to an increase in dissonance (e.g., Freedman and Sears, 1965;
Lowe and Steiner, 1968), there is still the implication from
the hypothesis that information inconsistent with a decision
arouses dissonance or increases its magnitude even when an
individual is involuntarily exposed to it. In fact from this
implication and some data, Brehm and Cohen (1962) concluded
that this was indeed the case with unforeseen negative con-
sequences. It is obvious that such an approach is incomplete
in terms of understanding fait accompli events; yet it does
provide an excellent reference point around which to unify
5.
the research. Specifically, empirical work to be mentioned
here will include any study which introduces a postdecisional
event (e.g., information or consequence) implying that an
individual has erred in some way.
Research in which hindsight might have been operating
includes work by Brehm (1959), Sherman (1970), Marlowe,
Prager, and Nuttall (1965), and Walster and Prestholdt (1966).
Some indirect support for the present approach is offered by
Watts (1966), and Brehm and Jones (1970).
The initial study concerning the fait accompli issue
was reported by Brehm (1959)* Young children chose to eat
a disliked vegetable. Following this decision each child
rated the vegetable more favorably, as dissonance theory
would predict. In a second experimental condition each child,
after eating the vegetable, was informed that a note was
being sent to his parents telling them he had eaten the
vegetable. This negative consequence was introduced fait
accompli and raised the liking of the vegetable to a higher
level than occurred in its absence.
From the findings of this study, Brehm concluded that
an unforeseen consequence can affect dissonance arousal and
reduction when it is preceded by a dissonance arousing deci-
sion. Brehm and Cohen (1959), in fact, attempted to show
the importance of prior dissonance arousal on fait accompli
consequences. Unfortunately their choice (prior dissonance)
manipulation did not work, making their results equivocal.
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The focus here, however, is not on the initial decision but on
how "unforeseeable" the unfavorable consequence in the Brehm
study really was.
Prior to the experimental manipulations, each child was
asked to answer a number of questions. Of these, one asked
how often the vegetable was served at home, and another how
often the child ate the vegetable when it was served. The
possibility exists that these particular questions may have
played a role in a child's perception of the note to his par-
ents. More specifically, this unfavorable consequence, which
was introduced fait accompli , may not in hindsight have been
so unforeseen. A child might have felt that he should have
foreseen this occurrence because the experimenter had asked
about his eating of the vegetable at home. Thus, after the
unfavorable, fait accompli consequence happened, a child
could have seen the preceding questions as cues foreshadow-
ing the note to his parents. In other words, there were cues
in the situation which made the consequence, after it occurred,
foreseeable.
A study by Sherman (1970) supports the present interpre-
tation. Subjects wrote a counterattitudinal essay either
under conditions of choice or no choice. After the essay was
written, half of the subjects were informed that their essays
were to appear signed in a college publication. When the
counterattitudinal essay had been written under choice con-
ditions, there was greater attitude change in the direction
7.
of the counterattitudinal position than under a no choice
oondition, as predicted from dissonance theory. The fait
accompli manipulation increased the amount of attitude
change only when the essay was written by choice.
Once again we should ask how unforeseen the unfavorable
consequence was. It is reported «... the essays were not
anonymous, and they were to be read by a group of people as
a means of coming to a relevant and important decision con-
cerning the issue" (Sherman, 1970; p. 515). in addition,
the fait accompli manipulation instructed the subjects that
the reason why the essay would be in the school publication
was to tap student attitudes on the issue. A subject, there-
fore, could feel that the experimenter was only specifying
what was generally known at the time the choice was made.
A third study in which hindsight might have occurred is
reported by Marlowe, Prager, and Nuttall (1965). This exper-
iment investigated the dissonance prediction that the greater
the suffering the greater the tendency to revalue beliefs and
to engage in overt action consistent with these beliefs. The
latter hypothesis was confirmed, while the former was not
(explained as possibly caused by a ceiling effect). For
present purposes we should consider the suffering manipula-
tion since it was introduced fait accompli . Subjects fil-
led out an attitude scale and then were told if they had
the right attitudes they could earn a certain amount of
money. No subjects qualified for the money because no one
8.
had the proper attitudes (the fait accompli manipulation).
Interpreting this study in the context of the present
rationale, it is possible that the fait accompli consequence
was cued since the experimenter's statement could have led a
subject to consider the possibility of a favorable or an un-
favorable outcome. A similar interpretation has been given
to data presented by Eagly and Whitehead (1972).
While the previously discussed research has operation-
alized fait accompli events as unexpected consequences of a
choice, Walster and Prestholdt (1966) looked at how unfavor-
able, fait accompli information operated after an initial
commitment. To the extent commitment is a component of
choice, as Brehm and Cohen (1962) have proposed, this study
is not unlike the others except for the difference in the
manipulation of the fait accompli event.
In the Walster and Prestholdt study female subjects
listened to a case history of a mother and daughter, and then
were asked to evaluate each of them in a written statement.
The case history was arranged so that a bad incident by the
daughter would cause subjects to write a less favorable
evaluation of the daughter than of the mother. Subsequently
the experimenter manipulated commitment either by collecting
and reading the evaluations (strong commitment) or by not
collecting the evaluations and then having each subject rip
up her evaluation. After the commitment manipulation, subjects
were informed that the bad incident reported in the first case
9.
report was untrue (the fait accompli information). Subjects
then, heard a second case report after which they evaluated
the two women.
The study specifically tested the prediction that sub-
jects in a high commitment condition would justify their
initial evaluations (a prediction from dissonance theory),
while subjects in a low commitment condition would over-
compensate for their initial mis judgments . The results
generally supported these notions. Since the finding for
the high commitment condition is consistent with the present
speculations concerning the effect of fait accompli events,
it is relevant to ask whether or not hindsight might have
been present. The prospect is, in fact, likely. Before
subjects heard the second case study and had the bad inci-
dent explained, they were told that they "had undoubtedly
noticed some of the inconsistencies of the inexperienced
nursing student (the person presenting the first case
study)" (p. 90). One definite error (the bad incident) was
pointed out, but subjects could have felt that other errors
or inconsistencies existed about which they should have been
aware. In other words, by hindsight subjects could have
realized that they should have known the first case report
was not accurate. In this study, then, the experimenter may
have directly manipulated the subjects' hindsight at the time
the fait accompli information was presented.
All of the previously cited research has been interpreted
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as supporting the present hypothesis because cues existed
predeoisionally which could have made the subject feel that
he should have anticipated the outcome, A few experiments
have addressed this specific issue by manipulating the pre-
sence of predecisional cues (i.e., Watts, 1966; Brehm and
Jones, 1970).
Watts led his subjects to believe that they were engaged
in an experiment studying psychological factors related to
taste. In addition they were informed that either an electro-
physiological method or a taste method was to be used to
investigate the phenomenon. The experimenter pretended to
score some questionnaires and subsequently told the subjects
that they had either a 50-50 chance or a 95 out of 100 chance
of getting the electrophysiological method. After choosing
or not choosing to prepare for this method, the subjects
were told that they definitely would receive it (consonant
condition) or the taste method (dissonance condition). The
results, on the whole, showed dissonance reduction when sub-
jects had chosen to prepare for the electrophysiological
method under the 50-50 chance condition and the taste method
was the consequence. Thus, a dissonant consequence which is
foreseeable predeoisionally (i.e., 50% chance) creates greater
dissonance than a consequence whioh is not foreseeable pre-
deoisionally (i.e., only 5% chance).
Although these findings are predicted from a viewpoint
(i.e., inadequate justification and self-esteem theory)
11.
different from that under scrutiny here, they dovetail nicely
with the present hypothesis. That is, only when the unexpected
consequence could have been foreseen at the time of choice was
dissonance aroused. The difference between the two approaches
lies on one essential point. Watts argues that the possibility
of the consequence happening must be seen at the time the
decision is made. The present approach argues that the fait
accompli consequence does not have to be foreseen at the time
of choice, but that after the consequence does occur it must
be perceived as an event that ought to have been foreseen.
Furthermore, the notion the unfavorable events cued
predecisionally differ from unfavorable events not cued in
this manner gathers additional support from Brehm and Jones
(1970). This experiment looked at both unfavorable and favor-
able fait accompli consequences. Only the former are rele-
vant to the present discussion.
After one of two record albums was selected, the chosen
album was rated more favorably, and the unchosen album was
rated less favorably than before choice occurred. This re-
sult supports a prediction from dissonance theory. Moreover,
when one of the two record albums was picked with a subject
knowing his decision determined whether he received two free
movie tickets (positive consequence) or did not receive the
tickets (negative consequence), there was marginally greater
dissonance reduction when no tickets were received as compared
to the control group. Dissonance theory predicted this find-
12.
ing since not receiving the tickets made the unchosen alter-
native more attractive and thus created greater dissonance
arousal.
In yet another experimental condition subjects did not
know about the possibility of receiving the tickets at the
decision point. They learned about this possibility only
after making this choice. A comparison between these subjects
and the subjects who made the same decision knowing about the
possibility of receiving the tickets revealed significantly
less attitude change in the former than in the latter con-
dition.
The Brehm and Jones paper, then, indicates that not all
fait accompli consequences increase dissonance arousal above
that induced by the prior choice. The most parsimonious ex-
planation for this finding is in terms of a responsibility
notion. That is, an individual cannot be responsible for
something he could not reasonably be expected to have fore-
seen at the time he made his decision.
Now we shall consider the experimental work in which
hindsight was unlikely to be operating. These studies in-
olude the aforementioned work by Brehm and Jones (1970) as
well as the work of Freedman (1963), Linder, Cooper, and
Wicklund (1968), and Watts (1965). In fact it is on the
basis of two of these studies (Freedman; Watts) that Carl-
smith and Freedman (1968) have argued against any fait ac-
compli effects unless an individual has a "distorted belief
13.
system" (p. 488). Let us now consider these two experiments.
In the third experiment reported in his paper, Preedman
(1963) presented high or low justification either prior to
or after a subject engaged in a task. Prom cognitive dis-
sonance theory it was predicted that there would be greater
dissonance arousal and hence reduction with low justification
than with high. This prediction was supported when the
justification manipulation was introduced prior to the task.
The reverse results were found when the justification was
given after the task.
Upon scrutinizing the manipulations, we discover that
with high justification subjects were informed that their
task was quite useful, while subjects with low justification
were informed that their task was quite useless. In a sense,
then, Freedraan manipulated favorable and unfavorable conse-
quences within a single study, as he has himself stated. For
purposes of this section of the paper, we shall focus only on
the low justification condition.
Although no comparison was made between the group receiv-
ing the low justification manipulation before the task and
the group receiving the low justification manipulation after
the task, there is a difference in the means pointing to more
dissonance arousal in the former than in the latter condition.
This comparison is somewhat meaningful for present purposes.
An individual who receives the justification manipulation
before engaging in the task is responsible for doing a use-
Ik.
less task, thus dissonance should be aroused. To the extent
responsibility is lacking when the justification manipulation
is presented fait accompli, dissonance should not be aroused.
In fact, in this study hindsight and hence responsibility are
unlikely to be operating since prior to doing the task a sub-
ject was only instructed about how the task was to be performed.
Again it can be concluded that responsibility is a crucial
variable in obtaining dissonance effects.
It has been argued by Sherman (1970) that the Freedman
study may not be an unequivocal test of fait accompli events
because choice was not manipulated. Dissonance effects in
this study, however, were not found with a choice manipula-
tion; instead they were obtained when the individual engaged
in the task knowing about its consequence. It is possible to
argue, therefore, that fait accompli effects would occur if
the justification manipulation had been foreseeable by hind-
sight.
As in a previously discussed experiment, Watts (1965)
engaged subjects in a study of the psychological factors
underlying taste preference. Each subject was instructed
that this would be accomplished with the aid of a painful
electrophysiological method. Either a pleasant or an un-
pleasant solution was available under a condition of choice
or no choice. After the solutions had been tasted, it was
unexpectedly announced that the physician who was to admin-
ister the electrophysiological method was called away on an
15.
emergency (the fait accompli manipulation). It had been
predicted from dissonance theory that choosing an unpleasant
solution to undergo an unpleasant experience, and then to
find out that the experience was not to occur, would arouse
dissonance. However, the choice manipulation had an opposite
effect, and the pleasantness manipulation failed to elicit
any cognitive changes. Not only is Sherman's (1970, p. 518)
statement that the "initial decision was completely justified
in the light of external events" applicable, but it should
also be stressed that the fait accompli consequence could
not have been foreseen by hindsight.
One last experiment by Linder, Cooper, and Wicklund
(1968) provides further verification of the present inter-
pretation of fait accompli events . These researchers in-
vestigated the prediction from dissonance theory that the
greater the effort spent in obtaining a goal the more favor-
able is that goal. When subjects were pre-exposed, and com-
mitted themselves, to the effortful manipulation included
within a message concerning the counterattitudinal speech
they would hear, the dissonance prediction was supported.
When the presentation of the effortful manipulation followed
the individual's decision to hear the counterattitudinal
speech, the dissonance prediction went unsupported.
A close examination of the Linder et al. procedure re-
veals that the effort manipulation would have been impos-
sible to foresee by hindsight. Specifically, after subjects
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agreed to listen to a speech they were told they would have to
engage in the performance of effortful mental tasks before
they could actually listen to the speech. These prior mental
tasks were unexpected and not cued predecisionally. Once
again dissonance predictions are supported when an individual
feels responsible for the events but are not supported when
an individual feels no responsibility.
By way of review, this extensive analysis supports the
present emphasis on the importance of hindsight in understand-
ing fait accompli effects. The original Brehm proposal is
then modified such that an unforeseen negative event affects
dissonance arousal and reduction when it is preceded by a
dissonance arousing decision and by cues which in hindsight
make the consequence foreseeable . In addition, it is ex-
pected that when an individual does not feel responsibility
by hindsight for a fait accompli consequence he should be
inclined to revoke his decision, or suffer regret.
To this point the paper has been concerned with decisions
to which an individual is committed (i.e., a final and ir-
reversible decision). Other research examining the post-
decision process has investigated the effect of the rever-
sibility of an initial decision. For example, individuals
seek different kinds of information depending upon the rever-
sibility of the initial decision (Lowe and Steiner, 1968),
and react to inconsistent information differently depending
upon their degree of commitment (Walster and Prestholdt, 1966).
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Studies such as these highlight the potential usefulness of
considering reversible decisions in the present context.
For present purposes, then, it is expected that to the
extent an individual knows his decision can be reversed, any-
negative event tied to his initial preference should be use-
ful in decision making. If the unfavorable, fait accompli
event is known about prior to final commitment, the initial
preference should be reversed. Thus, the newly preferred
or chosen alternative should be more favorably evaluated than
the other alternative. Hindsight should make little difference.
An individual need not feel at all defensive about his initial
preference since it is clearly tentative and subject to
change
•
Favorable. Fait Accompli Events
It is sometimes the case that people who experience
favorable, fait accompli events feel that they should have
been able to anticipate them ("By hindsight I realize that
I should have known the painting I bought was a Matisse").
The viewpoint presented for unfavorable, fait accompli
events is also offered for favorable, fait accompli events.
That is, research showing the effectiveness of favorable,
fait accompli events on the level of dissonance has always
made the unexpected event foreseeable by hindsight. Exper-
iments failing to reject the null hypothesis, for the most
part, have offered little opportunity for this type of fore-
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seeability.
The studies on this issue are fewer and much more
equivocal than those previously cited concerning unfavorable,
fait accompli events. However, before looking at the empir-
ical work, we should determine why foreseeability by hind-
sight also plays an important role when favorable events are
introduced fait accompli
. Such an event could be construed
as a gold star (e.g., Kauffmann, 1971; Steiner, 1970). To
the extent hindsight is operating, a person is less likely
to perceive the event as tacked on to his decision since
presumably he should have known about it beforehand. After
all, a person cannot easily "pat himself on the back M for an
event (e.g., information or consequence) about which he
should have been aware at the time he made his decision. On
the other hand, an unforeseen and favorable event is more
likely to act as a gold star ( MNot only did I choose the
alternative I thought was best, but I also received an extra
benefit"). Thus, there should be greater dissonance reduction
without hindsight than with hindsight.
This argument can be presented from a more theoretical
perspective. It has been argued that hindsight elicits a
feeling of responsibility for an event (page 2). To the extent
dissonance theory is predictive when a person feels responsi-
bility, as the Cooper (1971) study implies, it should be ex-
pected that a favorable, fait accompli event presented with
hindsight is consonant with the decision. However, a favorable,
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fait accompli event presented without hindsight is not only
consonant but, because an individual is not responsible for
it, the event happens to be "newer". The importance of this
notion can be seen in a statement made by Festinger. "Since
dissonance exists in the first place because there were cog-
nitive elements corresponding to favorable characteristics
of the unchosen alternative and also cognitive elements cor-
responding to unfavorable elements of the chosen alternative,
it can be materially reduced by eliminating some of these
elements or by adding new (italics are the present author's)
ones that are consonant with the knowledge of the action
taken" (Festinger, 1957; p. W. Thus, to the extent an
individual is led to believe that a consonant bit of know-
ledge should have been known about predecisionally (he was
responsible for it by hindsight), that information is not
as "new" as it would be if an individual saw no reason to
believe it should have been known predecisionally. Therefore,
a greater spreading apart of the alternatives should occur
without hindsight than with hindsight. Moreover, one basic
difference between the effects of favorable and unfavorable
events introduced postdecisionally is that the favorable
events operate directly on the reduction process, while un-
favorable events works indirectly on the reduction process
by affecting the initial dissonance.
Previously it was mentioned that the effect of unfavorable,
fait accompli events might be argued from an implication of the
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controversial selective exposure hypothesis. Based on this
hypothesis, it is equally possible to derive a prediction
about favorable, fait accompli events. Pestinger (1957)
argued that not only do people avoid dissonance arousing
information, but they prefer dissonance reducing information.
The implication is that information consistent with a decision
reduces dissonance or decreases its magnitude even when an
individual is involuntarily exposed to it. Once again this
formulation is incomplete in terms of the hypothesis generated
in this paper; yet it also provides a reference point around
which to unify research. Specifically, empirical work to be
mentioned here will include any study which introduces a
postdecisional event implying that an individual has made a
good decision.
Support for the present approach can be gleaned from
the work of Preedman (1963), Linder, Cooper, and Jones (1967),
Brehm and Jones (1970), and Kauffmann (1971). A study by
Sherman (1970) is equivocal in its support, as well as its
applicability.
By way of review, the Freedman study investigated the
effect of timing and justification on task enjoyment. The
case for regarding the high and low justification condition
as manipulations of favorable and unfavorable consequences
has already been made (see page 13). Thus for purposes of
this section of the paper, we shall focus only on the high
justification condition. Although no comparison was made
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between groups receiving the high Justification manipulation
before versus after performing the task, there is a difference
between the means pointing to a more favorable evaluation of
the task in the latter than in the former condition.
The comparison is somewhat meaningful for present pur-
poses. An individual who receives the justification manip-
ulation before engaging in the task is responsible for doing
a useful task, thus little dissonance should be aroused. To
the extent that responsibility is lacking when the justifica-
tion manipulation is presented fait accompli , it should act
as a gold star. In fact, in this experiment hindsight, and
hence responsibility, were unlikely to be operating since
prior to doing the task a subject was only instructed about
how the task was to be performed.
This notion that a favorable consequence operates as a
gold star when responsibility is not involved receives some
indirect support from the research of Linder, Cooper, and
Jones (1967), and Sherman (1970). Both studies employed
variations of the forced compliance paradigm. The relevant
finding is that with no choice (i.e., no responsibility) an
increase in monetary reward increases attitude change. Kauf-
fman (1971), also employing a variation of the forced com-
pliance paradigm, has demonstrated that unexpected money
offered after commitment acts as a gold star.
The previously cited study by Brehm and Jones (1970)
also supports the present interpretation. The focus now is
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on the favorable consequence (i.e., receipt of movie tickets)
conditions of that experiment. Specifically, the relevant
comparison is between the conditions for which the favorable
consequence was or was not cued predecisionally
. Although
the difference is not significant, it is in the direction
expected by the present theoretical considerations. That is,
there is a greater spreading apart of the alternatives when
they are not cued. Moreover, there is a trend for the chosen
alternative associated with the favorable consequence to be
less favorably evaluated when cued predecisionally than when
not cued predecisionally.
Although the evidence is far from conclusive, it does lend
some credence to the hypothesis under investigation. The first
experiment reported in the Sherman (1970) paper also tested
the effect of favorable, fait accompli consequences. It fails,
however, to support the present notions about the effect of
hindsight and responsibility. Nevertheless, the experimental
manipulations may indicate that the findings are not an un-
equivocal test of these notions.
Subjects were engaged in a forced compliance situation.
They either had choice or no choice about writing a counter-
attltudinal essay. A $2.50 monetary inducement was mentioned
and given either before the essay was written or after the
essay was written. Additional subjects never received any
mention of an incentive. Since the no choice conditions
were briefly mentioned earlier in support of the gold star
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argument, they will not be discussed here. The main emphasis
now is on the choice conditions. The results showed a sig-
nificant difference between the no incentive conditions and
the two $2.50 conditions such that there was greater attitude
change in the former than in the latter two conditions. More-
over, there was no difference between the two $2.50 conditions.
These results would not be startling if it were not for the
fact that the monetary inducement could not have been fore-
seen by hindsight. Specifically, the experimenter said that
"while he was out of the room he had received a telephone call
indicating that a large grant for which he had applied in
conjunction with his work had been awarded" (p. 513).
The present hypothesis would have predicted that a favor-
able, fait accompli consequence, not foreseeable by hindsight,
should lead to greater attitude change when compared to a
group not receiving a favorable consequence. Additionally it
would have been expected that the unforeseen, favorable fait
accompli consequence should elicit greater attitude change
than that elicited when the consequence is foreseen. Clearly
these expectations were not confirmed.
A careful scrutiny of the procedure reveals a possible
reason why the present predictions were not supported. Sub-
jects received the postpayment manipulation after they wrote
the essay, but before they handed it over to the experimenter.
As Sherman has acknowledged the fait accompli manipulation may
not, in actuality, have been fait accompli since subjects,
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prior to the handing over the essay, might still have felt
that their decision could be revoked. Thus to the extent
the favorable consequence was not presented fait accompli ,
the results do not damage the present case.
To this point the predictions for favorable, fait ac-
compli events have been in terms of what happens when those
events occur after an irreversible, final decision. The case
has previously been made, however, about the possible utility
of investigating reversible decisions in the present context.
Let us now consider this variable. For present purposes, it
is expected that to the extent an individual knows his de-
cision can be reversed, a favorable event tied to his initial
preference should be useful in decision making. If the favor-
able, fait accompli event is known about prior to final com-
mitment, the initial preference should be reinforced. Thus,
the chosen alternative should be evaluated in the direction
of the favorable event to a greater extent than the nonchosen
alternative. Hindsight should make little difference. An
individual need not feel at all defensive about "patting him-
self on the back" for his initial preference since it is
clearly a tentative first impression.
Manipulating Hindsight
When fait accompli events are negative (i.e., when they
contradict a subjects decision) it should be relatively easy
to convince him that he could not reasonably have been
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expected to anticipate those events. Because such events
could not have been anticipated, his "incorrect" decision
does not reflect adversely upon his competence; everyone
would have made the same mistake. But convincing the sub-
ject that he should have foreseen the negative consequences
of his decision may be very difficult. Thus when fait accompli
consequences are negative a very strong manipulation may be
required to induce hindisght while a very weak manipulation
may suffice to induce denial of hindsight.
When fait accompli consequences are positive, the op-
posite state of affairs should prevail. Subjects should be
eager to claim hindsight because doing so is self-enhancing.
But denying hindsight implies that one's good decision was
a lucky guess or that it reflects an incomplete or inadequate
analysis of available information. Thus when fait accompli
events are favorable a strong manipulation should be required
to Induce denial of hindsight.
The foregoing discussion suggests that the adequacy of
any set of hindsight manipulations will depend upon whether
the fait accompli event is favorable or unfavorable, and
that no single set of manipulations is likely to be equally
successful for positive and negative events. Perhaps this
dilemma explains why previous studies have not ordinarily
examined the impact of hindsight in both fait accompli con-
ditions. The present research employs hindsight manipulations
that are designed to be successful when fait accompli con-
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sequences are negative; we anticipated that these manipulations
will be less uniformly successful when fait accompli conse-
quences are positive. Thus we explicitly hypothesize that
manipulation checks will reveal that a sizable portion of
subjects receiving the no hindsight manipulation will never-
theless claim hindsight when fait accompli consequences are
positive, but that the reverse will be the case when conse-
quences are negative. Given this expectation concerning the
effectiveness of hindsight manipulations it is reasonable to
anticipate that an internal analysis will be required to test
hypotheses dealing with the impact of the fait accompli events.
Hypotheses
Dissonance theory generally predicts postdecision changes
in the evaluation of both an accepted and a rejected alterna-
tive. But in the present study a fait accompli event is in-
troduced soon after the subject has reached his decision, and
the major aim of the research is to ascertain the effect of
this event. The event focuses on one of the two alternatives,
rather than on both, and it is designed to influence the sub-
ject's impression of his decision making.
In this experiment a subjects decision involves choosing,
either tentatively or finally, between two candidates for
admission into graduate school. Then, as a fait accompli
event, the subject received a "late" letter that is negative
toward either the chosen (unfavorable fait accompli ) or the
unchosen (favorable fait accompli ) candidate. In addition,
this letter and the experimenter's comments concerning it
assert that the content should (hindsight) or should not (no
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hindsight) have been anticipated by the subject.
Since the negative letter deals with only one of the
alternatives, it is a basic assumption of this study that
"reality" causes the target of the letter to be negatively
evaluated. Whether this change will represent the basic
mode of reduction, however, depends upon the experimental con-
dition. Dissonance is reduced by an augmentation of the
value of the chosen alternative and/or a diminution of the
value of the rejected alternative. When the rejected alter-
native is the target of the letter, the present formulation
predicts that the latter dissonance reducing response will
be dominant, although the former will occur to some extent.
On the other hand, when the chosen alternative is the target
of the letter, the present formulation predicts a complex
outcome. That is, enhancement of the chosen alternative will
occur only on dimensions which are not the subject matter of
the letter. Otherwise, the dominant response will be a
diminution of the other alternative.
Now let us consider the hypotheses. All of the hypoth-
eses in this section (1 through lc) concern the impact of an
unfavorable, fait accompli event on subject who have made a
final decision and who have, or do not have, hindsight.
Hypothesis 1 : Subjects with hindsight have greater
dissonance (defensiveness) than subjects without hindsight.
This hypothesis will be supported by a greater positive dif-
ference between the ratings of the chosen and rejected alter-
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native for subjects with hindsight than for subjects with-
out hindsight.
It is also possible to predict the relative effects of
hindsight on each alternative. Greater dissonance is typ-
ically indicated by greater dissonance reduction; that is,
an augmentation of the chosen alternative and/or a diminu-
tion of the rejected alternative. Since the chosen alter-
native is negatively evaluated by the fait accompli letter,
"reality" will prevent an augmentation of its value. How-
ever, "reality" will only intercede when subjects are eval-
uating dimensions of the chosen alternative that have been
previously evaluated by the fait accompli event. These
considerations lead to the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis la : Subjects with hindsight will evaluate
the rejected alternative more negatively than subjects with-
out hindsight.
Hypothesis lb : Subjects with hindsight will evaluate
the chosen alternative more positively than subjects with-
out hindsight only on dimensions which are unrelated to the
subject matter of the fait accompli event.
Hypothesis lc : Subjects with hindsight will change
their decisions less than subjects without hindsight.
The following two hypotheses (2 and 2a) concern the
impact of an unfavorable, fait accompli event on subjects
who have only made a tentative decision and who have, or do
not have, hindsight.
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Hypothesis 2: Hindsight treatments will not be dif-
ferentially effective. Furthermore, after receipt of the
fait accompli event, subjects in both hindsight conditions
will rate their tentatively chosen alternative more neg-
atively than their tentatively rejected alternative. Thus,
the difference between the ratings of the tentatively chosen
alternative and the tentatively rejected alternative for
both hindsight conditions will be negative.
When initial decisions are tentative, hindsight will not
mediate the impact of fait accompli event. This consideration
leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2a : When given an opportunity to make a final
decision following the receipt of fait accompli information,
subjects in the two hindsight conditions will be equally
inclined to select their tentatively unpreferred candidate
and reject their tentatively preferred candidate.
All of the next three hypotheses (3 through 3b) concern
the impact of favorable, fait accompli event on subjects who
have made a final decision and who have, or do not have,
hindsight»
Hypothesis 3 : Subjects with hindsight will reduce dis-
sonance less than subjects without hindsight. This hypothesis
will be supported by a greater positive difference between
the ratings of the chosen and rejected alternatives for sub-
jects without hindsight than for subjects with hindsight.
It is also possible to predict the relative effects of
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hindsight on the rejected alternative, but no firm prediction
can be made concerning effects on the chosen alternative.
Greater dissonance reduction is usually indicated by an
augmentation of the chosen alternative and/or a diminution
of the rejected alternative. When the rejected alternative
is the target of the unfavorable, fait accompli event, as is
the case here, "reality" facilitates a diminution of that
alternative. This lowering, however, is affected by the
"newness" of the consonant fait accompli event. Subjects
without hindsight will consider the event "newer" than sub-
jects with hindsight. "Reality" for the chosen alternative,
on the other hand, dictates that it be better than the re-
jected alternative. It is difficult to predict whether the
change in the rejected alternative is sufficient to reduce
dissonance or whether change in the chosen alternative is
necessary as well. These considerations lead to the following
hypotheses
.
Hypothesis 3a : Subjects without hindsight will neg-
atively evaluate the target of the fait accompli event (i.e.,
the rejected alternative) to a greater extent than will sub-
jects with hindsight. Thus, subjects without hindsight will
evaluate the rejected alternative more negatively than sub-
jects with hindsight.
No firm prediction can be made about the chosen alter-
native. It is possible, however, that subjects without
hindsight will enhance tne value of the chosen alternative
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to a greater extent than subjects with hindsight.
Hypothesis 3b : Subjects with and without hindsight
will not change their decisions.
The two hypotheses in this section (4 and 4a) concern
the impact of a favorable, fait accompli event on subjects
who have only made a tentative decision and who have, or
do not have, hindsight.
Hypothesis 4 : Hindsight treatments will not be dif-
ferentially effective. Furthermore, after the receipt of
the fait accompli event, subjects in both hindsight con-
ditions will rate their tentatively chosen alternative more
positively than their tentatively rejected alternative.
Thus, the difference scores between the ratings of the ten-
tatively chosen alternative and the tentatively rejected
alternative for both hindsight conditions will be positive.
When initial decisions are tentative, hindsight will
not mediate the impact of fait accompli events. This con-
sideration leads to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4a ; When given an opportunity to make a
final decision following the receipt of fait accompli in-
formation, subjects in the two hindsight conditions will be
equally inclined to select their tentatively preferred can-
didate and reject their tentatively unpreferred candidate.
The next three hypotheses (5 through 5b) concern the
impact of the unfavorable, fait accompli event presented
with hindsight. Therefore, these hypotheses compare sub-
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jects who have made a final decision and who then receive,
or do not receive, an unfavorable, fait accompli event with
hindsight.
Hypothesis 5: Subjects who receive the fait accompli
event will have greater dissonance (defensiveness) than sub-
jects who do not receive the fait accompli event. This hy-
pothesis will be supported by a greater positive difference
between the ratings of the chosen and rejected alternatives
for subjects who receive the fait accompli event.
It is also possible to predict the relative effects of
the fait accompli event on each alternative. Greater dis-
sonance is typically indicated by greater dissonance reduc-
tion; that is, an augmentation of the chosen alternative and/
or a diminution of the rejected alternative. Since the
chosen alternative is negatively evaluated, "reality" will
prevent an augmentation of its value. However, "reality"
will only intercede when subjects are evaluating dimensions
of the chosen alternative previously evaluated by the fait
accompli event. These considerations lead to the following
hypotheses.
Hypothesis 5a : Subjects who receive the fait accompli
event will evaluate the rejected alternative more negatively
than subjects who do not receive the fait accompli event.
Hypothesis 5b : Subjects who receive the fait accompli
event will evaluate the chosen alternative more positively
than subjects who do not receive the fait accompli event only
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on dimensions which are unrelated to the subject matter of
the fait accompli event.
The following hypotheses (6 through 6a) concern the
impact of the unfavorable, fait accompli event presented
without hindsight. Therefore, these hypotheses compare sub-
jects who have made a final decision and who then receive, or
do not receive, an unfavorable, fait accompli event without
hindsight.
Hypothesis 6: Subjects who receive the fait accompli
event will have greater regret than subjects who do not
receive the fait accompli event. This hypothesis will be
supported by a greater positive difference between the rat-
ings of the chosen and rejected alternatives for subjects
who do not receive the fait accompli event than for subjects
who do receive the fait accompli event.
It is also possible to predict the relative effects of
hindsight on the chosen alternative, but no firm prediction
can be made about the rejected alternative. Greater regret
is indicated either by a converging of the values of the
chosen and rejected alternatives or a more favorable eval-
uation of the rejected alternative than the chosen alternative.
When the chosen alternative is the target of the negative
event, as is the case here, "reality" facilitates a dimin-
ution of that alternative. "Reality" for the rejected alter-
native, on the other hand, indicates that it is not as bad
as was originally thought. It is difficult to predict
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whether change in the chosen alternative is sufficient to
show regret or whether change in the rejected alternative
is necessary as well. These considerations lead to the
following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 6a: Subjects who receive the fait accompli
event will negatively evaluate the target of the fait ac-
compli event (i.e., the chosen alternative) to a greater
extent than will subjects who do not receive the fait ac-
compli event.
No firm prediction can be made about the rejected alter-
native. It is possible, however, that subjects who receive
the fait accompli event will enhance the value of the re-
jected to a greater extent than subjects who do not receive
the fait accompli event.
The following hypothesis concerns the impact of the
favorable, fait accompli event presented with hindsight.
Therefore, this hypothesis compares subjects who have made
a final decision and who then receive, or do not receive, a
favorable, fait accompli event with hindsight.
Hypothesis 7 : Subjects who receive the fait accompli
event will reduce dissonance to the same degree as subjects
who do not receive the fait accompli event.
This hypothesis follows from the notion that people do
not consider a favorable, fait accompli event introduced with
hindsight to be "new" . Presumably subjects have already
employed this material in reducing their dissonance. To the
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extent the event Is considered "new", the next series of
hypotheses is applicable.
The following two hypothesis (8 through 8a) concern
the impact of the favorable, fait accompli event presented
without hindsight
.
Therefore, these hypotheses compare
subjects who have made a final decision and who then receive,
or do not receive, a favorable, fait accompli event without
hindsight.
Hypothesis 8: Subjects who do not receive the fait ac-
compli event will reduce dissonance less than subjects who
receive the fait accompli event (i.e., their judgments of
the chosen and nonchosen candidates will be less disparate).
It is also possible to predict the relative effects of
hindsight on the rejected alternative, but no firm prediction
can be made concerning the chosen alternative. Greater dis-
sonance reduction is usually indicated by an augmentation of
the chosen alternative and/or a diminution of the rejected
alternative. When the rejected alternative is the target
of the unfavorable, fait accompli event, as is the case here,
"reality" facilitates a diminution of that alternative.
"Reality" for the chosen alternative, on the other hand,
dictates that it be better than the rejected alternative.
It is difficult to predict whether the change in the rejected
alternative is sufficient to reduce dissonance or whether a
change in the chosen alternative is necessary as well. These
considerations lead to the following hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 8a: Subjects who receive the fait accompli
event will negatively evaluate the target of the fait accompli
event (i.e., the rejected alternative) to a greater degree
than will subjects who do not receive the fait accompli
event.
No firm prediction can be made about the chosen alter-
native. It is possible, however, that subjects who receive
the fait accompli event will enhance the value of the chosen
alternative to a greater extent than subjects who do not
receive the fait accompli event.
Hypothesis 9: Manipulation checks will reveal that a
sizable portion of subject receiving the no hindsight manip-
ulation will, nevertheless, claim hindsight when fait ac-
compli events are favorable, but the reverse will be the
case when the consequences are negative. Given this expec-
tation concerning the effectiveness of hindsight manipulations,
it is reasonable to anticipate that an internal analysis will
be required to test hypotheses dealing with the impact of the
fait accompli events.
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CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
The subjects were 109 female students from an intro-
ductory psychology course. Participation in psychology
experiments is optional, but contributes extra-credit points
toward the course grade. One subject was eliminated because
of procedural difficulties. The numbers of subjects in the
eight conditions were unequal: final decision, unfavorable
event, hindsight condition, n = 10; final decision, unfavor-
able event, no hindsight condition, n = 13; final decision,
favorable event, hindsight condition, n 12; final decision,
favorable event, no hindsight condition, n = 10; tentative
decision, unfavorable event, hindsight condition, n = 11;
tentative decision, unfavorable event, no hindsight condition,
n = 10; tentative decision, favorable event, hindsight con-
dition, n * 12 j tentative decision, favorable event, no
hindsight condition, n = 13. Within each cell, at least
five subjects chose each of two candidates. Seventeen sub-
jects who hade a final decision but received no late infor-
mation, constituted a control group.
Procedure
Subjects were scheduled individually. The experimenter
explained that undergraduate students have not yet partic-
ipated in the selection of graduate students and that their
participation is desirable since graduate students do influence
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an undergraduate's academic life. Subjects were told that
they would be given the folders of two of the candidates
currently under consideration by the faculty. All subjects
received the same two folders. The credentials in the
folders were described as typed copies of the originals, and
all references to the students' school and the names of the
writers of the letters of recommendation were said to have
been removed. Subjects were then informed that they had
fifteen minutes to study the files. (Most subjects took
about 15 minutes
.
)
Candidates' credentials
. Each of the folders which a
subject was given contained a candidate's Graduate Record
Examination scores, Miller Analogy Test score, transcript of
grades, statement of purpose, and two letters of recommen-
dation. The scores for the standardized tests were each
prefaced by a statement concerning the nature of the test
and how best to interpret a particular score. The candidates*
scores were rather similar. (Candidates 1 credentials are in-
cluded in Appendix l).
The major difference between the two candidates was in
the courses which they had taken in college. Their over-
all averages were rather similar, and around a B. Stevenson
was a psychology major with a minor in business. Behrend,
on the other hand, was a psychology major with a minor in
education. Their statements of purpose were designed to
demonstrate how the candidates proposed to integrate their
40.
ability into a graduate program in psychology. They were
permitted to look through the files again. The experimenter
advised them to "consider this only a tentative decision,
one that can be changed. At a later time you will make a
final decision which we will use in comparing faculty and
undergraduate decisions .
Favorable vs. unfavorable fait accompli events . After
the subjects had ranked the candidates, the experimenter
prepared all but the control subjects to receive a "late"
letter of recommendation. (At this point subjects in the
control group filled out the dependent measures.) The exper-
imenter was not aware of how subject had ranked the candidates.
Therefore, the experimenter was blind as to whether the "late"
letter he handed to the subject concerned the subject's chosen
or nonchosen candidate. Since the letter always negatively
evaluated a candidate, receiving it would be an unfavorable
event when it concerned the chosen candidate, but a favorable
event when it concerned the nonchosen candidate.
Hindsight manipulations . The experimenter explained that
in this experiment he was trying to simulate the actual pro-
cedure which the faculty goes through when making their deci-
sions. Then he said the following:
It is, in fact, often true that the faculty makes ten-
tative (final) decisions and then gives the dean a
listing of the students about whom they have made these
tentative (final) decisions (before sending out state-
ments of acceptance or rejection). You have, in a sense,
made such a tentative (final) decision. However, addi-
tional information about these candidates may come in
and the faculty must contend with it. As you were told
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at the outset of the study, such was the case with oneof your candidates, (m the preceding sentence, the
?£ ™i< I y?U -:: Sfc2dy '
M was not included in the speechto subjects in the final decision conditions.) I wouldlike to tell you its content briefly and give you my
reactions to it. *
Next the experimenter read a hindsight or a no hindsight
statement to the subjects:
I think the letter makes an excellent point by stressing
that the writer's viewpoint of is based on the
I act that did well in courses which (only athis college) are notoriously known to be memory-oriented
gut-type courses, and did not do well in logical and
creative courses. In fact, the writer emphasizes that(there is no reason why) you should have realized this
when you made your decision. In other words,, the cause
of the patterning in «s grades should (not) be
obvious to you. (They are unique to his college.) It
should (not) be obvious, then, that the courses
.did well in were memory-oriented and the courses he did
poorly in involved logic and creativity. As a matter of
fact, most of the students who have read «s
file felt that way. I don't know whether you did or did
not realize the reasons, but you should (not) have. In
other words, the cause of the patterning should (not)
have been a consideration when you made your decision.
I tell you this because you should keep it in mind when
you read the letter yourself. So now why don't you read
the letter yourself and then look over the files again
if you wish.
The spaces were filled with the name of the candidate the
letter concerned (i.e., Behrend or Stevenson). For subjects
in tentative decision treatment groups, the word "tentative"
was said prior to every mention of the word "decision."
Subjects then received a letter corresponding to the
statements made by the experimenter. In hindsight conditions
subjects were told that the patterning was obvious and then
received a letter making the same statement. In the no hind-
sight conditions subjects were told that the patterning was not
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obvious and then received a letter making the same statement.
The letters were typewritten on standard referral forms
(see Appendix 2) and again stressed the obviousness or non-
obviousness of the patterning of the students' grades. That
is, the candidate did well in memory-oriented work and poorly
in creative work. The writer pointed out specific courses
which supported the patterning. These courses differed for
the two candidates. Stevenson's good grades were in education
and non-laboratory-oriented psychology courses; Behrend's
good grades were in business courses and non-laboratory-
oriented psychology courses. Stevenson's poorer grades were
in philosophy, mathematics, and laboratory-oriented psychology
courses; Behrend's poorer grades were in economics, mathe-
matics, and laboratory-oriented psychology courses. At the
conclusion of each letter, the writer declined to recommend
that the candidate be accepted into graduate school.
Dependent measures . After the subject had read the
"late" letter and looked through the files again, she re-
sponded to the dependent variable instruments. Scales calling
for evaluations of the chosen candidate, the nonchosen can-
didate, the importance of each of the candidate's academic
credentials, and the importance of academic credentials for
acceptance into graduate school were presented in a single
booklet described as "a number of questions about the two
candidates." On a second questionnaire, which was "designed
to elicit student opinion, since the faculty is undecided
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about the usefulness of late-arriving information," subjects
responded to items assessing their reaction to the "late-
letter, the effectiveness of the hindsight manipulation, and
their responsibility for their decision. On a third ques-
tionnaire subjects responded *o items which assessed the
effectiveness of the finality of decision manipulation, and
their confidence in their decision.
Responses to all questionnaire items were on 9-point
rating scales. These items are more fully presented in the
results section and in Appendix 3. The items were ordered
so that all subjects first evaluated the candidate discussed
in the "late" letter. Since subjects in the control group
did not receive a letter, the order in which they evaluated
the candidates was random. Control subjects did not receive
the second questionnaire.
After completing the last questionnaire, subjects were
offered an opportunity to change their decision. Subjects
in final decision treatments were told that they were being
afforded the opportunity because it seemed unfair to compare
their initial decisions with the faculty's recent consid-
erations which were, in part, based on the use of the "late"
information. Subjects in tentative decision treatments were
simply asked to make a final decision. Control subjects did
not receive the opportunity to change. Finally, subjects
completed the following statement designed to assess suspi-
cion concerning the manipulations: "I think the purpose of
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the experiment is..." Thorough debriefing followed.
Summary of procedures
The manipulations were designed to create a 2 X 2 X 2
design. Subjects made either a final or a tentative deci-
sion and then received a negative "late" letter of recom-
mendation concerning either their chosen candidate (unfavor-
able treatment) or their nonchosen candidate (favorable treat-
ment). Subjects were further led to believe that the infor-
mation in the "late" letter should have been known by them
(hindsight treatment) or should not have been known by them
(no hindsight treatment).
^5.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
This study was designed to assess the impact of hind-
sight on reactions to favorable and unfavorable fait ac-
compli ©vents. Female subjects made either final or ten-
tative decisions which they found to be either supported
or not supported, with hindsight or without hindsight.
Thus the study was planned as a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial. How-
ever, a fourth independent variable was manipulated when
the study was conducted. To ensure that a subject had
decision freedom, she was offered an opportunity to select
one of two almost equally attractive candidates for graduate
school. It was possible that a subject's post-choice re-
actions could depend upon which of the candidates she had
chosen. This variable is not of theoretical import except
when it interacts with any of the other independent vari-
ables and/or when it affects any of the relationships be-
tween other independent variables. Therefore, the results
reported in this paper are based on a 2 X 2 X 2 least-
squares analysis of variance with mention being made of the
findings of a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 least-squares analysis only
when they are theoretically important. Also the results of
the four-way analysis will be reported for the manipulation
check items since it is important for testing the hypoth-
eses that the manipulations are effective for all appropriate
treatments.
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Manipulation Checks
Subjects were asked to report their hindsight by
indicating, on a 9-point rating scale, the degree to which
they should have realized the reasons why their chosen
candidate was, or was not, a strong applicant for graduate
school. Subjects' mean ratings of their hindsight appear
in Table 1. Subjects in hindsight treatment groups reported
greater hindsight than subjects in the no hindsight treat-
ment groups (hindsight, X = 7.02; no hindsight, X = 4.17;
P = 62.28, df = l/75i £<.001). When subjects were appor-
tioned on the basis of favorability of event, finality of
decision, and identity of the first-ranked candidate, tests
of simple effects indicated significant effects of the hind-
sight manipulation for all comparisons (j><.03) but one.
Only a weak effect of the hindsight manipulation (£<.l4) was
found for subjects who chose Stevenson in the tentative de-
cision-unfavorable condition. Moreover, as was predicted by
Hypothesis 9» subjects receiving a favorable event (confir-
mation of their choice) indicated greater hindsight than
subjects receiving an unfavorable event (F 24.94, df = l/75»
£ <.001).
Insert Table 1 about here
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TABLE 1
Mean Ratings of Hindsight
(Pooled over Decision Conditions)
Event Hindsight No
Hindsight
Combined
Hindsight
Treatments
Favorable 7.79 5.13 6.49
Unfavorable 6.14 3.22 4.61
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The latter finding tends to complicate the analysis.
Although the hindsight manipulation was equally effective
for both the favorable and unfavorable treatment groups,
the amount of hindsight generated in the unfavorable treat-
ment groups was significantly lower. A comparatively low
level of hindsight, as in the hindsight-unfavorable con-
ditions (see Table 1), may be insufficient to produce the
dissonance reducing responses which were hypothesized to
occur. Also, the resemblance between the means for the no
hindsight-favorable treatment groups (X = 5.13) and the
hindsight-unfavorable treatment groups (X 6.14) suggests
that at least three levels of hindsight have been produced
instead of two, and that the levels of hindsight are not
independent of favorable and unfavorable events. Thus, it
is likely that the hypotheses will not be well supported
and that, as predicted by Hypothesis 9, an internal analysis
will be necessary.
Subjects reported their impressions of the finality of
their decisions by indicating, on a 9-point rating scale,
the likelihood that the experimenter would allow them to
change their ranking of the candidates at a later time. Sub-
jects in the tentative decision treatment groups reported a
greater likelihood of being allowed to change than did subjects
in the final decision treatment groups (tentative decision,
X - 6.74; final decision, 7 = 3.16; F = 55.68, df 1/75,
p_<.001). When subjects were apportioned on the basis of
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favorability of the event, degree of hindsight, and identity
of the first-ranked candidate, tests of the simple effects
indicated significant effects of the manipulation of finality
of decision for all comparisons but two. The effect
of the finality of decision manipulation was marginal (£<.08)
both for subjects who chose Behrend in the hindsight-favorable
condition and for subjects who chose Stevenson in the no hind-
sight-unfavorable condition. In addition, subjects receiving
a favorable event indicated less likelihood of being allowed
to change than subjects receiving an unfavorable event (favor-
able event, X 4.51; unfavorable event, X = 5.^5; P = 5.22,
1/75, £ <.02). Also subjects who chose Behrend indicated
less likelihood of being allowed to change than subjects who
chose Stevenson (Behrend, X = ^.55; Stevenson, X = 5.^1;
P = 5.31, df = 1/75, £ <.02).
It is of interest to note that the two candidates were
chosen almost equally often- (51$ vs. ty% of the time). Thus
it appears that we were successful in offering subjects two
almost equally attractive options.
In summary, both manipulations of hindsight and of
finality of decision produced strong main effects on responses
to questionnaire items designed to evaluate their potency.
However, the level of hindsight produced in subjects who
received the negative event was comparatively low, end neither
manipulation appears to have had effects that were completely
independent of all other manipulated variables.
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Dependent Measures
The rating scales to which subjects responded can be
subsumed under seven categories: l) candidate's originality,
2) candidate's potential as a graduate student, 3) importance
of a candidate's academic credentials on subjects' ratings,
*0 importance of graduate school admission criteria, 5)
candidate's affability, 6) subjects' reactions to the "late"
letter of recommendation, and 7) subject's impression of her
initial decision. Scales were assigned to categories and
then, within a category, combined or treated individually on
the basis of their 1) manifest content, and/or 2) correlation
with other scales. For categories 1,2,3, and 5 the same
questions were asked about the chosen and nonchosen alter-
native. Thus it is appropriate to consider these two alter-
natives as divisions of the four categories.
Candidate's originality
. Three scales were assigned to
this category because they were moderately intercorrelated
(jo <.005 by one-tailed test), and because they dealt with
originality, memorization ability, and creativity. These
items were also distinct from others in that their contents
were explicitly covered in the "late" letter of recommendation.
In Table 2 the item intercorrelations for the chosen candidate
are reported above the diagonal, while correlations for the
nonchosen candidate are shown below the diagonal. (The same
system will be employed when reporting the interitem cor-
relations for other categories, in Tables 3>^> and 5.) Each
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subject's rating of the candidate's originality was obtained
by computing the mean of her ratings on the three scales in
this category (candidate evaluated by the "late" letter,
Items 1,2, and * f Part 1, Questionnaire 1; candidate not
evaluated by the
-late- letter, Items 1,2, and k t Part 2,
Questionnaire 1).
Insert Table 2 about here
Candidate's graduate school potential . Each subject's
rating of a candidate's graduate school potential was ob-
tained by computing her mean score on four items dealing with
motivation, intelligence, graduate school potential, and re-
search potential (candidate evaluated by the "late" letter,
Items 3,5,7, and 8, Part 1, Questionnaire 1; candidate not
evaluated by the "late" letter, Items 3,5,7, and 8, Part 2,
Questionnaire 1). The interitem correlations appear in
Table 3. All but one of the correlations are significant at
the .025 level by one-tailed test. Teaching potential (can-
didate evaluated by the "late" letter, Item 6, Part 1, Ques-
tionnaire 1; candidate not evaluated by the "late" letter,
Item 6, Part 2, Questionnaire 1) was originally regarded as
a probable component of graduate school potential, but it
was eliminated from the category because it did not correlate
highly with other items.
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TABLE 2
Interitem Correlations Between Components
of the Originality Dependent Variable for
Chosen and Nonchosen Candidates 1
Items Originality Memorization
Ability Creativity
Originality
Memorization
Ability
Creativity
.49
.88
.39
.55
.85
.35
1. The correlations above the diagonal are those
obtained from ratings of the chosen candidate; the
correlations below the diagonal are those obtained
from the ratings of the nonchosen candidate.
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Insert Table 3 about here
Unlike the items in Category 1, these scores deal with
issues not explicitly covered by the "late" letter of recom-
mendation, or covered in a way which blatantly contradicted
the information conveyed by earlier letters. Consequently,
a subject's responses to the items in Category 2 should have
been based upon a much less secure conception of "reality"
than was the case for items in Category 1.
Importance of a candidate's academic credentials for
subjects' ratings
. This category was composed of five items
dealing with the different types of credentials in a can-
didate's folder. Of these items, two were combined, and
three were treated individually. A subject's rating of the
importance of a candidate's standardized tests was obtained
by computing the mean score on two items dealing with the
importance of a candidate's Graduate Record Examination
scores and Miller Analogy Test score (candidate evaluated by
the "late" letter, Items lb and Id, Part 3, Questionnaire 1;
candidate not evaluated by the "late" letter, Items 2b and
2d, Part 3, Questionnaire 1). The interitem correlations
appear in Table ^. The two scales were moderately correlated
(jd<.005 by one-tailed test). The importance of a candidate's
transcripts, filed letters of recommendation, and statement of
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purpose were treated individually (candidate evaluated by the
"late" letter, Items la, lc, and le, Part 3, Questionnaire 1;
candidate not evaluated by the "late" letter, Items 2a, 2c,
and 2e, Part 3, Questionnaire 1).
Insert Table k about here
Importance of academic credentials as graduate school
admission criteria
. Whereas the previous category tapped
the importance of academic credentials for subjects' ratings
of a specific candidate, the items in this category assessed
the importance of these credentials in a more general way,
as criteria for graduate school acceptance. The seven items
included in this grouping concerned either the same type of
academic credentials of interest in the previous grouping or
other bases of admission. Of these items, two were combined,
and five were treated individually.
A subject's rating of the importance of standardized
tests as an admission criterion was obtained by computing
the mean score on two items dealing with the importance of
Graduate Record Examination scores and Miller Analogy Test
score (Items 3 and 4, Part k t Questionnaire l). The two
scales were significantly correlated (r .70, df = 106,
£<.005 by one-tailed test). The importance of transcripts,
TABLE 1*
Interitem Correlations Between Components of
the Importance of a Candidate's Standardized
Tests for Chosen and Nonchosen Candidates!
Items GRE
Scores
MAT
Scores
GRE Scores
.67
MAT Scores .62
1. The correlation above the diagonal
is obtained from the ratings of the
chosen candidate; the correlation below
the diagonal is obtained from ratings
of the nonchosen candidate.
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letters of recommendation, and statement of purpose were
assessed individually (Items 5,6, and 7, Part 4, Question-
naire 1). Also subjects answered an open-ended question
dealing with criteria, other than those already tapped,
they thought should be used as a basis for acceptance into
graduate school (Item 8, Part k, Questionnaire 1). Lastly
subjects answered a single item assessing the importance of
accepting students of lower academic ability when they have
an ability to relate to undergraduate problems (Item 9, Part k t
Questionnaire l).
Affability. A subject's rating of affability was ob-
tained by computing the mean score on seven items dealing
with likeableness, modesty, industriousness
,
friendliness,
the extent to which people want to get to know the candidate
better, sincerity, and the ease of gaining admiration (can-
didate evaluated by the "late" letter, Items 1-7, Part 5,
Questionnaire 1; candidate not evaluated by the "late" letter,
Items 1-7, Part 6, Questionnaire 1). The interitem correla-
tions appear in Table 5, Not only are the interitem correla-
tions significant (jd<.025 by one-tailed test), but each item
concerns a favorable attribute. An additional personality-
type item concerned competitiveness (candidate evaluated by
the "late" letter, Item 8, Part 5, Questionnaire 1; candidate
not evaluated by the "late" letter, Item 8, Part 6, Question-
naire l). It was not included as a component of this depen-
dent variable since its status as a favorable attribute is
58.
questionable.
Insert Table 5 about here
Subjects' reactions to the "late" letter of recommen-
dation
. This category was composed of six items concerned
with reactions to the "late" letter. A subject's rating of
the "newness" of the information contained in the letter was
obtained by computing the mean score on two items concerned
with realizing the reasons contained in the letter, and
knowing the information contained in the letter (Items 2 and
8, Questionnaire 2). Thus, to the extent a subject did not
realize the reasons and/or know the information, the infor-
mation was considered "new" . The inter! tem correlation was
significant (r .70, df = 106, £ <.005 by one-tailed test).
A subject's evaluation of the extent to which the information
in the letter was biased, influential in changing her view-
point, and important were treated individually (Items 3,*J-,
and 7, Questionnaire 2). In addition, a subject's evaluation
of the letter writer's bias was assessed by a single item
(Item 6, Questionnaire 2).
Subject's impression of her initial decision . Besides
the manipulation check dealing with the finality of her
initial decision (Item 1, Questionnaire 3) a subject rated
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two other aspects of her decision. Her confidence that the
decision was a good one (Item 2, Questionnaire 3) and her
responsibility for the decision (Item 5, Questionnaire 2) were
assessed individually.
Difference Scores
Since many of the same questions were asked about the
chosen and nonchosen candidates, difference scores were
calculated for the subjects' ratings of these items. The
rating of the nonchosen candidate was subtracted from the
rating of the chosen candidate. A positive score indicates
that a higher rating on a particular dimension was given to
the chosen candidate than to the nonchosen candidate, A
negative score indicates that the chosen candidate was given
a lower rating on a particular dimension than the nonchosen
candidate.
Predictions about the difference scores are proposed in
Hypotheses 1,2,3, and 4 and can, for the most part, be tested
in one analysis. Since each of the hypotheses is concerned
with comparisons of difference scores on evaluative items,
the dependent variable categories dealing with the candidates'
originality, graduate school potential, affability, teaching
potential, and competitiveness will be reported together.
Hypothesis 1 concerns the impact of an unfavorable event
on subjects who have made a final decision and who have, or
do not have, hindsight. It proposes that there will be a
greater positive difference score for subjects with hindsight
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than for subjects without hindsight. Furthermore, it was
expected that support would take the form of a positive
difference score for subjects with hindsight and a negative
difference score for subjects without hindsight. Hypothesis
2 concerns the impact of an unfavorable event on subjects
who have made a tentative decision and who have, or do not
have, hindsight. It proposes that the difference scores
for both hindsight treatments will be negative and not dif-
ferent from each other. Hypothesis 3 concerns the effect
of a favorable event on subjects who have made a final
decision and who have, or do not have, hindsight. It pro-
poses that there will be a greater positive difference score
for subjects without hindsight than for subjects with hind-
sight. Moreover, all scores should be positive. Lastly,
Hypothesis k concerns the effect of a favorable event on
subjects who have made a tentative decision and who have,
or do not have, hindsight. It proposes that the difference
scores for both hindsight treatments will be positive and
not different from each other.
A few of the hypotheses proposed in this study predict
no differences. Hypotheses 2 and 4 did, and so too did a
few others, which will subsequently be reviewed. Of course,
the null hypothesis can never be confirmed, only disconfirmed,
but the hypotheses were stated in this way to emphasize that
only under certain conditions was an independent variable
expected to be differentially effective.
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Difference scores on evaluative Items . The above hy-
potheses lead to the expectation that the difference scores
on the evaluative items will be lower and more negative for
unfavorable treatments than for favorable treatments, unless
that event is received after a final decision and with hind-
sight. No specific prediction was offered about that con-
dition. To test the hypotheses, scores of the three unfavor-
able treatment groups were pooled and compared with the po-
oled scores of the three favorable treatment groups. (The
final decision-hindsight treatment group was not included in
either pooled sample.) Mean ratings appear in Table 6 where
it can be seen that all but one of the differences between
favorable and unfavorable treatment groups were significant.
Insert Table 6 about here
The data were also analyzed as a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial,
without excluding any groups of subjects. The results
indicate that, over all conditions, the unfavorable treat-
ments produced significantly lower (more negative) difference
scores than the favorable treatments (see Table 7).
Insert Table 7 about here
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TABLE 6
The Effect of Favorable vs. Unfavorable Events
on Difference Scores (Pooled Across All Treat-
ments Except Those Involving Pinal De-
cision with Hindsight)
Favorable Unfavorable FaVariable
Originality 3.17 -2.10 202.56**
Graduate
School 2.32
-.59 57.11**
Potential
Teaching ?? ^Potential 1#77 * 24 3 * 19
Affability 1.3^ -.01 29.30**
Competitive- 1#Q9 _M
* £<.08
** £<.001
a Significance levels of F values were assessed with
df 1/67.
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TABLE 7
The Effect of Favorable vs. Unfavorable Events
on Difference ScoresTPooled Across All
Treatments
)
Dependent
Variable Favorable Unfavorable pa
Originality 3.26
-2.05 297.80**
Graduate
School
Potential
2.4l
-.51 94.12**
Teaching
Potential 1.83 .25 4.87*
Affability 1.38
.03 40. 34**
Competitive-
ness 1.72 .50 24.30**
* £<.03
** £<.001
a Significance levels of F values were assessed with
df = 1/83.
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When the identity of the chosen candidate was added as
a fourth independent variable, there was an interaction be-
tween that variable and favorability on ratings of graduate
school potential (P = 5-38, df » 1/75, £<.02). However,
simple effects tests demonstrated that regardless of which
candidate was chosen, difference scores were lower for unfavor-
able treatments than for favorable treatments.
Prom the four hypotheses reviewed above, it was also
expected that the impact of hindsight would be mediated by
the finality of the decision and the favorability of the event.
No such triple interaction was found.
Difference scores on items dealing with the importance
of the candidates 1 academic credentials for subjects' ratings .
An analysis of the difference scores in this category yielded
significant effects for two of the items: l) standardized
test importance, and 2) importance of the statement of purpose.
In general, these analyses indicated that hindsight, finality
of the decision, and favorability each had differential ef-
fects but only under limiting conditions.
An analysis of the difference scores for the importance
of standardized tests yielded a significant interaction be-
tween finality of the decision and hindsight (F = 5.30, df =
1/83, £ <.02). The means for this interaction appear in
Table 8. Simple effects tests demonstrated that only with a
tentative decision were hindsight treatments differentially
effective. Specifically, subjects in hindsight conditions
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indicated that standardized tests were less important for
their ratings of their chosen candidate than their nonchosen
candidate, while subjects in no hindsight conditions showed
the opposite effect. Additional simple effects tests demon-
strated that the no hindsight treatment affected responses
differently depending upon the finality of the decision (F =
*K77, df b 1/83, £<.03). That is, subjects who made a final
decision indicated that standardized tests were less important
for their ratings of their chosen candidate than their non-
chosen candidate, while subjects who made a tentative decision
showed the opposite effect.
Insert Table 8 about here
When the data were analyzed with the identity of the
chosen candidate as an independent variable, there was an
interaction between that variable and finality of the decision
(F = 5.87, df «= 1/75, £ <.02). The means for the interaction
appear in Table 9. Analysis of the simple effects demon-
strated that only when Behrend was the chosen candidate were
finality of decision treatments differentially effective
(F = *K66, df = 1/75, £<.03). Specifically, subjects who
made a final decision indicated that standardized tests were
less important for their ratings of their chosen candidate
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TABLE 8
Mean Difference Scores for the Importance of
the Candidates' Standardized Tests (Pooled
Over Favorability Conditions)
Decision Hindsight No Hindsight
Final
.09 -.09
Tentative
-.11 .26
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than their nonchosen candidate, while subjects who made a
tentative decision showed the opposite effect.
Insert Table 9 about here
The identity of the chosen candidate also interacted
with hindsight and favorability (F = 5. 30, df = 1/75, £ <.02).
The means for the triple interaction appear in Table 10.
Tests of the simple effects demonstrated that only with an
unfavorable event and Behrend as the preferred candidate were
hindsight treatments differentially effective (F = 3.96, df =
1/75, 2<»°5). Specifically, subjects in high hindsight con-
ditions indicated that standardized tests were less important
for their ratings of their chosen candidate than their non-
chosen candidate, while subjects in no hindsight conditions
showed the opposite effect.
Insert Table 10 about here
In summary, the analyses demonstrated that the dif-
ferential effects of hindsight were limited to either ten-
tative decision conditions or unfavorable treatments when
69.
TABLE 9
Mean Difference Scores for the Importance of the
Candidates' Standardized Tests (Pooled Over
Hindsight and Favorability Conditions)
Decision
Chosen Candidate
Behrend Stevenson
Pinal
-.07
.07
Tentative .26
-.14
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TABLE 10
Mean Difference Scores for the Importance of the
Candidates 1 Standardized Tests (Pooled Over
Decision Conditions)
Chosen Favorable Event Unfavorable Event
Candidate
Hindsight
H1gBlght Hindsight Hi^sight
Behrend .21 .13 -.18 .25
Stevenson -.04 .18 -.05 -.23
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Behrend was top-choice. Similarly, the differential effects
of finality of the initial decision were limited to either
no hindsight conditions or conditions in which Behrend was
top-choice.
A three factor analysis yielded no significant effects
on the importance of the candidates' statements of purpose.
However, a four-way analysis yielded a significant interaction
between favorability and the identity of the chosen candidate
(P = 6.57, df = 1/75, £<.0l). The means for the interaction
appear in Table 11. Analysis of the simple effects demon-
strated that only when Stevenson was ranked first were favor-
ability treatments differentially effective (P = 7.7^, df
1/75, £<.007). Specifically, subjects in unfavorable treat-
ments indicated that a statement of purpose was less important
for their ratings of their chosen candidate than their non-
chosen candidate, while subjects in favorable treatments showed
the opposite effect.
Insert Table 11 about here
The four-way analysis also yielded a significant inter-
action between the hindsight treatments and the identity of
the chosen candidate (F = 3.96, df 1/75, £<.05). The means
for the interaction appear in Table 12. Simple effects tests
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TABLE 11
Mean Difference Scores for the Importance of the
Candidates' Statement of Purpose (Pooled Over
Hindsight and Decision Conditions)
Chosen Favorable Unfavorable
Candidate Event Event
Behrend 0 .22
Stevenson .52 -.33
73.
demonstrated that only when Behrend was top-choice were hind-
sight treatments differentially effective (P = 5.17, df =
1/75, £<.03). That is, subjects in hindsight treatments
indicated that a statement of purpose was less important for
their ratings of their chosen candidate, while subjects in
no hindsight treatments showed the opposite effect.
Insert Table 12 about here
In summary, the analysis demonstrated that favorability
was differentially effective only when Stevenson was top-
choice. Similarly, hindsight was differentially effective
only when Behrend was top-choice.
Comparisons of the difference scores of Control and
Experimental subjects. Hypotheses 5,6,7, and 8 each concern
a comparison between one of the final decision treatments
and the control group. Comparisons were limited to these
experimental groups since the initial decision made by the
control group was final. Unlike subjects in the experimental
groups, control subjects never received the favorability or
hindsight manipulations. Since each of the hypotheses is
concerned with comparisons of difference scores on evaluative
items, those that are significant will be reported together.
Hypotheses 5 and 6 will be considered separately from Hypothes
7*.
TABLE 12
Mean Difference Scores for the Importance of the
Candidates' Statement of Purpose (Pooled Over
Decision and Favorability Conditions)
Chosen U5 , . , L No
Candidate Hindsight Hin£°ight
Behrend
-.22 ,hZ
Stevenson
.23 0
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7 and 8 since the former deal with an unfavorable event, while
the latter deal with a favorable event. However, all relevant
means and analyses concerned with the hypotheses appear in
Table 13.
Hypothesis 5 concerns the impact of an unfavorable event
on subjects who have made a final decision and have hindsight.
It proposes that there will be a greater positive difference
score for subjects in this experimental condition than for
subjects in the control group. Hypothesis 6 concerns the
impact of an unfavorable event on subjects who have made a
final decision and have no hindsight. It proposes that there
will be a greater positive difference score for subjects in
the control group than for subjects in this experimental con-
dition.
The difference scores for the hindsight, no hindsight,
and control conditions were analyzed by a one-factor least-
squares analysis of variance. These scores (see Table 13)
were significantly different on originality (F = 22.05,
df = 2/37, £<.00l) and graduate school potential (F = 5.32,
df = 2/37, £<.009). As a test of Hypothesis 5 the hindsight
group means were compared to the control group means by Dun-
ne tt's test (see Winer, 1962). The means were significantly
different, but their patterning was opposite to that proposed.
Hypothesis 6 was also tested by using Dunnett's test to com-
pare the no hindsight group means to the control group means.
The means were significantly different and in the proposed
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direction.
Hypothesis 7 concerns the impact of a favorable event on
subjects who have made a final decision and have hindsight.
It proposes that the difference scores will be comparable for
the experimental and control groups. Hypothesis 8 concerns
the impact of a favorable event on subjects who have made a
final decision and have no hindsight. It proposes that there
will be a greater positive difference score for subjects in
the experimental group than for subjects in the control group.
The difference scores for the hindsight, no hindsight,
and control conditions were analyzed by a one-factor least-
squares analysis of variance. These scores (see Table 13)
were significantly different on originality (P = 17.16, df
2/36, J3<.00l) and graduate school potential (P = 7.. 18, df =
2/36, jd<.002). To test Hypothesis 7 the hindsight group
means were compared to the control group means by Dunnett's
test. The means were significantly different; thus it appears
that hindsight did affect the magnitude and positivity of a
difference score. Hypothesis 8 was also tested by using
Dunnett's test to compare the no hindsight and control group
means. These means were significantly different and in the
proposed direction.
Insert Table 13 about here
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Also the one-factor least-squares analysis between hind-
sight, no hindsight, and control conditions for the favorable
treatments yielded a significant effect on the difference
scores of the importance of standardized tests (F = J*. 30,
df
- 2/36, £<.02). Dunnett's test revealed the hindsight
group mean (X = .25) differed significantly from the control
group mean (X =
-.12; d = 2.92, df = 3/36, £ <.01), while the
no hindsight group mean (X = 0.00) did not differ from the
control group mean (d<l).
Chosen Candidate
Predictions about the chosen candidate are proposed in
Hypotheses lb, 2,3, and Since each of the hypotheses
concerns comparisons on evaluative items, the dependent
variable categories dealing with the candidate's originality,
graduate school potential, affability, and competitiveness
will be reported together.
Hypothesis lb concerns the impact of an unfavorable
event on subjects who have made a final decision and who
have, or do not have, hindsight. It proposes that the chosen
candidate should be more attractive to subjects with hind-
sight than without hindsight only on items tapping a less
secure conception of "reality" Hypothesis 2 concerns the
impact of an unfavorable event on subjects who have made a
tentative decision and who have, or do not have, hindsight.
It proposes that the chosen candidate should not be very
attractive for either group of subjects, and that the treatment
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groups should not be different from each other. Hypothesis 3
concerns the impact of a favorable event on subjects who have
made a final decision and who have, or do not have, hindsight.
It proposes that the chosen alternative should be attractive
for either treatment group, but no firm prediction is of-
fered concerning any differential effect of hindsight. It
was tentatively suggested that the chosen alternative might
be more attractive to subjects without hindsight than with
hindsight. Finally Hypothesis 4 concerns the effect of a
favorable event on subjects who have made a tentative deci-
sion and who have, or do not have, hindsight. It proposes
that the chosen candidate should be attractive for both
groups of subjects, and that the treatment groups should not
be different from each other.
Again it must be pointed out that the various hypotheses
predict no differences. Although this amounts to trying to
prove the null hypothesis, which cannot be done, the hypotheses
were stated in this manner to emphasize that only under cer-
tain conditions was an independent variable expected to have
differential effects.
Evaluative i terns . These hypotheses lead to the expec-
tation that subjects in unfavorable treatments will evaluate
the chosen oandidate less favorably than subjects in favor-
able treatments, unless the event is received after a final
decision and with hindsight. No specific prediction was
offered about that condition. To test the hypotheses, scores
80.
of the three unfavorable treatment groups were pooled and
compared with the pooled scores of the three favorable
treatments. (The final decision-hindsight treatment group
was not included in either pooled sample.) Mean ratings
appear in Table 14 when it can be seen that all differences
between favorable and unfavorable treatment groups were
significant. A four-way analysis of the entire sample of
data yielded an interaction for graduate school potential
which indicated that the favorability effect was not general
(see Table 16). The analysis is presented more fully below.
Insert Table 14 about here
The data were also analyzed as a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial,
without excluding any group of subjects. The results in-
dicated that the chosen candidate was significantly less
attractive for subjects in the unfavorable treatment groups
than for subjects in the favorable treatment groups, (see
Table 15).
Insert Table 15 about here
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TABLE 14
The Effect of Favorable vs. Unfavorable Events
on Mean Ratings of the Chosen Candidate (PooledAcross All Treatments Except Those Involving
Final Decision With Hindsight)
Dependent
Variable Favorable Unfavorable Fa
Originality- 5.73 3.36 9^.33***
Graduate
School
Potential
7.03 5.80 30.29***
Affability 6.82 6.29 6.73**
Competitive-
ness 6.80 5.88 6.12*
* £<.02
** £<.0l
*** £<.001
a Significance levels for F values were assessed
with df a 1/67.
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TABLE 15
The Effect of Favorable vs. Unfavorable Events
on Mean Ratings of the Chosen Candidate (Po-
oled Across All Treatments)
Dependent
Variable Favorable Unfavorable F
a
Originality 5.76 3.M lJii.5it**«
Graduate
School
Potential
6.98 5.78. *f2.87***
Affability 6.7^ 6.28 6.38*-*
Competitive-
ness 6.60 5.91 5.05*
* £ <.03
** £<.01
*** £<.001
a Significance levels
with df = 1/83.
for F values were assessed
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The predictions of Hypothesis lb concerning any item
depend upon how securely the item is based on "reality".
That is, on items for which "reality" is clear there should
be no difference between hindsight conditions for the final
decision-unfavorable treatments, while hindsight treatments
whould differ on items for which "reality" is unclear. This
distinction leads to the expectation that when the four hy-
potheses are tested in one analysis, outcomes should differ
for the two types of items only in final decision-unfavorable
event conditions. For both types of items, hindsight treat-
ments should not differ for either tentative decision con-
dition, and might or might not differ for the final decision-
favorable treatment groups. Therefore, it was expected that
the impact of hindsight would be mediated by the finality of
the decision, and by the favorability of the event on items
tapping a less secure basis of "reality" (e.g., graduate
school potential). On the other hand, items which tap a
relatively secure conception of "reality" (e.g., originality)
might show no effects of hindsight. Or, if the hindsight
treatments differ for final decision-favorable event groups,
the impact of hindsight might be mediated by the finality of
the decision, and the favorability of the event.
No item for which "reality" was unclear demonstrated
that hindsight was mediated by the finality of the decision,
or by the favorability of the event. However, when the data
(see Table 16) were analyzed in a four-factor analysis, there
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was a significant interaction between hindsight and the
identity of the chosen candidate (P = 4.58, df = 1/75,
£ <.04) as well as a significant four-way interaction (F =
7.05, df 1/75, £<.01) on ratings of graduate school po-
tential, an item for which "reality" is unclear. When sub-
jects were apportioned on the basis of finality of decision,
and the favorability of the event, the interaction between
hindsight and the identity of the chosen candidate was
significant (j><.01) for all comparisons but one. These
variables did not interact for tentative decision-unfavorable
treatments. Tests of simple effects of the significant inter-
actions demonstrated that hindsight differentially affected
response for two comparisons. First, when Stevenson was top-
choice in the final decision-unfavorable treatments, hind-
sight lowered the evaluation of the chosen alternative's
graduate school potential (F = 4.17, df = 1/75, £<.05).
Secondly, when Behrend was top-choice in the tentative deci-
sion-favorable treatments, hindsight raised the evaluation
of the chosen alternative's graduate school potential (F
10.58, df = 1/75, £ <.002).
Additional analyses of the four-way interaction were
performed to ascertain the generality of the effect of favor-
ability as reported in Tables 14 and 15. When subjects were
apportioned on the basis of finality of the decision, hind-
sight, and identity of the chosen candidate, tests of the
simple effects indicated significant differences between
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favorable and unfavorable treatment groups for all conditions
but three. There were marginal effects, in the expected
direction, when Behrend was top-choice for the tentative de-
cision-no hindsight treatments (£ <.U) and when Stevenson
was top-choice for the tentative decision-hindsight treat-
ments (£<.09). However, when Stevenson was top-choice for
the final decision-no hindsight treatments, the means tended
to go in a direction opposite to that proposed.
Insert Table 16 about here
A least-squares analysis of variance yielded a signif-
icant triple interaction (F 3.90, df = 1/83, £<.05) for
originality
,
an item which is more securely based on "reality"
The means for the interaction appear in Table 17. Simple ef-
fects tests demonstrated that only for tentative decision-
favorable treatments were hindsight conditions differentially
effective (P = kA7, df » 1/83, Specifically, sub-
jects with hindsight indicated that the chosen alternative had
more originality than subjects without hindsight. Additional
analyses of the triple interaction were performed to ascertain
the generality of the effect of favorability reported in
Tables 14 and 15. When subjects were apportioned on the basis
of finality of decision and hindsight, simple effects tests
86.
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demonstrated that the differences between favorable and unfavor-
able treatment groups were quite general (jds<.001). Other
simple effects tests demonstrated that only for no hindsight-
favorable treatments were finality of decision treatments
differentially effective (P = 5.12, df = 1/83, £<.03). That
is, subjects who made a final decision indicated that the
chosen alternative had more originality than subjects who made
a tentative decision.
Insert Table 17 about here
In summary, the analyses of graduate school potential
and originality show somewhat different patternings for the
effects of hindsight. As was expected, hindsight was dif-
ferentially effective for the final decision-unfavorable
treatments on graduate school potential but hot on originality.
However, the differential effects of hindsight were opposite
to those predicted, and limited to subjects who chose Steven-
son. The results for the tentative decision-favorable treat-
ments were somewhat more comparable for the two dependent
measures. That is, on originality hindsight was differentially
effective while on graduate school potential hindsight was
differentially effective only for subjects who chose Behrend.
These findings do not support the present hypotheses.
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TABLE I?
Mean Rating of the Chosen Candidate
on Originality
Pinal Decision Tentative Decision
Event
HindSlght
Hindsight Hindsight ^
Favorable 5. 81 6.10 6.00 5. 21
Unfavorable 3.57 3.^1 3.18 3. 50
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The importance of the chosen candidate ' s academic ere.
dentjals for subjects' r^r^s. An analysis of subjects*
responses to the scales in this category yielded significant
effects for three of the items: l) transcript importance,
2) statement of purpose importance, and 3) standardized test
importance. In general these analyses indicated that hind-
sight and favorability each had differential effects under
limited conditions. On the other hand, finality had dif-
ferential effects which were rather general.
Subjects in hindsight conditions indicated that the
chosen candidates transcript was more important than subjects
in no hindsight conditions (F = 6.23, df = 1/83, £<.01).
Yet hindsight and favorability interacted (F = 6. 70, df =
1/83, £<.01) indicating that the effect of hindsight was
limited to only the favorable treatments, where it was highly
significant by a simple effects test (P « 12.54, df = 1/83,
£<.001). The means for the interaction appear in Table 18,
Additional simple effects tests indicated that only for high
hindsight conditions was favorability differentially effective
(F 3.9**, df 1/83, £<.05). That is, subjects in unfavor-
able conditions indicated that transcripts were less important
for their ratings of the chosen candidate than subjects in
favorable conditions.
Insert Table 18 about here
90.
TABLE 18
Mean Ratings of Chosen Candidate on Transcript and
Statement of Purpose Importance (Pooled Across
Decision Conditions)
Dependent
Variable Event Hindsight
No
Hindsight
Transcript
Importance
Favorable
Unfavorable
7.63
6.6?
5.96
6.70
Statement of
Purpose
Importance
Favorable
Unfavorable
7.67
7.24
6.96
7.78
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A significant interaction between hindsight and favor-
ability was also found on the importance of the statement of
purpose (P = 3.90, df - 1/83, £<.05). The means (see Table
18) patterned similarly to those on transcript importance;
however, simple effects tests demonstrated that only with no
hindsight treatments were favorability treatments differen-
tially effective, and then only marginally (F 3.27, df
1/83, £<.07). Specifically, subjects in unfavorable con-
ditions indicated that statements of purpose were more impor-
tant for their ratings of the chosen candidate.
The last dependent variable analyzed in this category
was the importance of standardized tests. Subjects who made
a final decision reported significantly less importance of
standardized tests (X 5.02) than subjects who made a ten-
tative decision (X - 5.70; F *K05, df 1/83, £<.05).
Comparisons between Control and Experimental ratings .
Hypotheses 5b, 6a, and 7 each concern a comparison between
one of the final decision treatments and the control group.
The rationale for the limited nature of these comparisons
has been previously explained. Since each of the hypotheses
is concerned with comparisons of the ratings on evaluative
items, those that are significant will be reported together..
Hypotheses 5b and 6a will be considered separately from
Hypothesis 7, since the former deal with an unfavorable event,
while the latter deals with a favorable event.
Hypothesis 5b concerns the impact of an unfavorable
92.
event on subjects who have made a final decision and have
hindsight. However, its predictions depend upon how securely
an item is based on "reality". That is, the chosen candidate
will be more attractive for subjects in the experimental
group than the control group on items tapping a less secure
conception of "reality" (e.g., teaching potential and graduate
school potential), but the chosen candidate will be less at-
tractive for subjects in the experimental group than the
control group on items for which "reality" is clearer (e.g.,
originality). Hypothesis 6a concerns the impact of an unfavor-
able event on subjects who have made a final decision and have
no hindsight. It proposes that the chosen candidate will be
less attractive for subjects in the experimental condition
than for subjects in the control group.
The scores for the hindsight, no hindsight, and control
conditions were analyzed by a one-factor least-squares analysis
of variance. These scores (see Table 19) were significantly
different on originality (P = ^-0.28, df = 2/37, jd<.001) and
graduate school potential (P = 13.99, df 2/37, £<.001).
A significant effect for teaching potential (F = ^.56, df
2/3^i £<.02) occurred when the identity of the chosen can-
didate was included as a second factor in the analysis. As
a test of Hypothesis 5*> the hindsight group means were compared
to the control group means by Dunnett's test. The means for
originality, an item for which "reality" is securely based,
were significantly different, and in the proposed direction.
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The means for graduate school potential and teaching potential,
items for which "reality- is not securely based, were signif-
icantly different, but in the direction opposite to that
proposed. Hypothesis 6a was also tested by using Dunnett's
test to compare the no hindsight group means to the control
group means. The means were significantly different for two
of the comparisons, and all means were in the proposed direction.
Insert Table 19 about here
Hypothesis 7a concerns the impact of a favorable event
on subjects who have made a final decision and have hindsight.
It proposes that the attractiveness of the chosen alternative
will be comparable for the experimental and control groups.
No specific hypothesis was offered about the impact of a
favorable event on subjects who have made a final decision
and have no hindsight. However, it was tentatively sug-
gested that the chosen alternative might be more favorably
evaluated by subjects in the experimental group than by sub-
jects in the control group.
The scores for the hindsight, no hindsight, and control
conditions were analyzed by a one-factor least-squares analysis
of variance which yielded a significant effect on graduate
school potential (P = 3.67, df 2/36, £<.04). Dunnett's
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test revealed that the hindsight group mean (X = 6.85) only
marginally differed from the control group mean (X = 7.2k;
d » 1.90, df « 3/36, £<.05), while the no hindsight group
mean (X
- 6.70) differed significantly from the control group
mean (d = 2.52, df = 3/36, £<.025). This last finding clearly
supports the suggestion made about the impact of a favorable
event on subjects who have made a final decision and have no
hindsight. The finding for the comparison between hindsight
and control groups suggests that perhaps hindsight does in-
fluence the ratings after all.
Also, the one-factor least-sqaures analysis between hind-
sight, no hindsight, and control conditions for the favorable
treatments yielded a significant effect on the scores of
,
transcript importance (P «= 9.53, df - 2/36, £<.00l). Dun-
nett's test revealed that the hindsight group mean (X = 7.^2)
did not differ significantly from the control group mean
(X = 7.65, d<l), while the no hindsight group mean (X 5.&0)
did differ significantly from the control group mean (d
k.l6 t df = 3/36, 2 4.005).
Nonchosen Candidate
Predictions about the nonchosen candidate are proposed
in Hypotheses la, 2, 3a, and k. Since each of the hypotheses
is concerned with comparisons on evaluative items, the de-
pendent variables dealing with the candidate's originality,
graduate school potential, teaching potential, affability,
and competitiveness will be reported together.
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Hypothesis la concerns the impact of an unfavorable
event on subjects who have made a final decision and who
have, or do not have, hindsight. It proposes that the non-
chosen candidate will be less positively evaluated by sub-
jects with hindsight than without hindsight. Hypothesis 2
concerns the impact of an unfavorable event on subjects who
have made a tentative decision and who have, or do not have,
hindsight. It proposes that the nonchosen candidate will be
positively evaluated by both treatment groups and that these
groups will not be different from each other. Hypothesis 3a
concerns the effect of a favorable event on subjects who have
made a final decision and who have, or do not have, hindsight.
It proposes that the nonchosen candidate will be more nega-
tively evaluated by subjects without hindsight than with
hindsight. Finally, Hypothesis b concerns the effect of a
favorable event on subjects who have made a tentative decision
and who have, or do not have, hindsight. It proposes that
the nonchosen candidate will be negatively evaluated by both
treatment groups and that these treatment groups will not be
different from each other.
Again the reader is cautioned that, although a number of
predictions are stated in terms of trying to prove the null
hypothesis, such a task is not possible. The rationale for
predictions of this type was simply to emphasize that certain
variables should have differential effects only when certain
prescribed conditions exist.
Evaluative items. These hypotheses lead to the expec-
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tation that the nonchosen candidate will be more positively
evaluated by subjects in the unfavorable treatments than
by subjects in the favorable treatments, unless the event is
received after a final decision and with hindsight. No
specific prediction was offered about the latter condition.
To test the hypotheses, scores of the three unfavorable
treatment groups were pooled and compared with the pooled
scores of the three favorable treatment groups. (The final
decision-hindsight treatment group was not included in either
pooled sample.) Mean ratings appear in Table 20 where it can
be seen that all comparisons between favorable and unfavorable
treatment groups are significantly different and in the pro-
posed direction.
Insert Table 20 about here
The data were also analyzed as a 2 X 2 X 2 factorial,
without excluding any group of subjects. The results (see
Table 21) indicated that subjects in unfavorable treatment
groups evaluated the nonchosen candidate significantly more
favorably than subjects in favorable treatment groups.
Insert Table 21 about here
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TABLE 20
m! o°! Favorable vs. Unfavorable Events
?S« ?*?
*atinSs of thelTonchosen Candidate(Pooled Across All Treatments Except ThoseInvolving Final Decision With Hindsight)
Variable Favorable Unfavorable P
Originality- 2.56 5.^6 165.83**
Graduate
School
Potential
4.71 6.39 40.59**
Teaching
Potential 5.09 6.35 5.83*
Affability 5.48 6.29 11.71**
Competitive-
ness 4.91 6.32 12.07**
* £<.02
** £<.001
a Significance of P values were assessed with
df = 1/67.
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TABLE 21
The Effect of Favorable vs. Unfavorable Events
on Mean Ratings of the Nonchosen Candidate
(Pooled Across All Treatments)
Dependent „ .„ „ _ «
Variable Favorable Unfavorable F
a
Creativity 2.50 5.46 248.02**
Graduate
School 4.57 6.29 58.16**
Potential
mSSSL MB 6.23 8.03*
Affability 5.36 6.24 17.86**
Competitive. ^ 6 ^
* jo<.006
** £<.001
a Significance of F values were assessed with
df • 1/83.
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Prom the four hypotheses reviewed above, it was also
expected that the effectiveness of hindsight would be me-
diated by the finality of the decision and the favorability
of the event. No such effect was found.
The analyses did yield a main effect for finality of
the decision on graduate school potential and affability
(see Table 22). Specifically, subjects who made a final
decision evaluated the candidate less favorably than sub-
jects who made a tentative decision.
Insert Table 22 about here
The importance of the candidate's academic credentials
for subjects 1 ratings » Analysis of the scales in this
category yielded significant effects for two of the items:
l) transcript importance, and 2) the importance of the filed
letters of recommendation. In general these analyses indicated
that hindsight, finality of decision, and favorability each
had differential effeots but only under limited conditions.
A least-squares analysis of variance of the scores for
transcript importance yielded a significant interaction be-
tween hindsight and favorability of the event (F = 10.28,
df « 1/83,. 2< .002) . The means for the interaction appear in
Table 23. Simple effects tests demonstrated that only in the
101.
TABLE 22
The Effect of Pinal and Tentative Decisions
on Mean Ratings of the Nonchosen Candidate
(Pooled Across All Treatments)
Dependent
Variable Final Tentative P
a
Graduate
School 5.1^ 5.66 7.14**
Potential
Affability 5.58 5.99 4.70*
* £<.03
** o<.009
a Significance of P values were assessed with
df = 1/83.
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favorable treatment groups were hindsight treatments dif-
ferentially effective (P = 11.97, df = 1/83, £<.001). That
is, subjects with hindsight indicated that the transcript
was more important than subjects without hindsight. Ad-
ditional simple effects tests demonstrated that only for no
hindsight treatment groups were favorability treatments dif-
ferentially effective (F = ?.J>, df = 1/83, £<.009). Spe-
cifically, subjects receiving unfavorable treatments indicated
that transcripts were more important than subjects receiving
favorable treatments.
Insert Table 23 about here
Analysis of subjects' ratings of importance of the
filed letters of recommendation yielded a significant inter-
action between finality of the decision and hindsight (P *
*K88, df = 1/83, £<.03). The means for the interaction
appear in Table 2k, Tests of the simple effects demonstrated
that only for high hindsight conditions were finality of the
decision conditions differentially effective (F = 5.02,
df = 1/83, £<.03). That is, subjects who made a final
decision reported that the filed letters were more important
than subjects who made a tentative decision.
TABLE 23
Mean Ratings of the Importance of the Nonchosen
Candidate's Transcript (Pooled Across Final and
Tentative Decision Conditions)
Event Hindsight „, ,N? UJ& Hindsight
Favorable 7.42 5,91
Unfavorable 6.67 7. 09
101*.
Insert Table 2k about here
Comparisons between Control and Experimental ratings .
Hypotheses 5a, 7, and 8a each concern a comparison between
one of the final decision conditions and the control group.
The rationale for the limited nature of these comparisons
has been offered previously. Hypothesis 5a will be considered
separately from Hypotheses 7 and 8a since the former deals
with an unfavorable event, while the latter deal with a favor-
able event. Since each of the hypotheses is concerned with
comparisons of the nonchosen candidate on evaluative items
the dependent variables dealing with creativity, graduate
school potential, and competitiveness will be reported to-
gether.
Hypothesis 5a concerns the impact of an unfavorable event
on subjects who have made a final decision and have hindsight.
It proposes that the nonchosen candidate will be more neg-
atively evaluated by the experimental group than the control
group. No specific hypothesis was offered about the impact
of an unfavorable event on subjects who have made a final
decision and have no hindsight. However, it was tentatively
suggested that the nonchosen candidate might be more favorably
evaluated by subjects in the experimental group than by sub-
jects in the control group.
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TABLE 24
Mean Ratings of the Importance of the Nonchosen
Candidate's Piled Letters (Pooled Across
Pavorability Conditions)
Decision Hindsight No
Hindsight
Pinal 8.14 7.74
Tentative 7.48 7.96
t
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The ratings for hindsight, no hindsight, and control con-
ditions were analyzed by a one-factor least- squares analysis
of variance. No significant effects were found.
Hypothesis 7 concerns the impact of a favorable event
on subjects who have made a final decision and have hindsight.
It proposes that the nonchosen candidate should not be pos-
itively evaluated by either the experimental or the control
group, and that these treatment groups should not be dif-
ferent from each other. Hypothesis 8a concerns the impact
of a favorable event on subjects who have made a final deci-
sion and have no hindsight. It proposes that the nonchosen
candidate will be less positively evaluated by subjects in
the experimental treatment groups than by subjects in the
control group.
The ratings of hindsight, no hindsight, and control
conditions were analyzed by a one-factor least-squares anal-
ysis of variance. The scores (see Table 25) were significantly
different on originality (P * 32.62, df = 2/36, jo <.00l),
graduate school potential (P = 13.33, df = 2/36, £<.001),
and competitiveness (P = 3.31, df - 2/36, £^.05). As a test
of Hypothesis 7 the hindsight group means were compared to
the control group means by Dunnett's tests. For two of the
comparisons the means were significantly different indicating
that hindsight lowers the evaluation of the nonchosen can-
didate. Hypothesis 8a was. also tested by using Dunnett's
test to compare the no hindsight group means to the control
107.
group means. The means were significantly different, and all
means were in the proposed direction.
Insert Table 25 about here
Also a one-factor least-squares analysis between hind-
sight, no hindsight, and control conditions for the favor-
able treatment groups yielded a significant effect on the
scores (see Table 26) of transcript importance (P 9.*i4,
df 2/36, jb<.001) and the importance of standardized tests
(P 3.6*f, df - 2/36, jo<.0^) 3 . Dunnett's tests revealed
that the hindsight group mean did not differ from the control
group mean for either measure, while the no hindsight group
mean did differ from the control group mean for both measures.
Specifically, subjects in the no hindsight treatment groups
reported that each credential was less important than subjects
in the control group.
Insert Table 26 about here
Findings on other dependent measures
The importance of graduate school admission criteria .
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Subjects in the unfavorable treatment groups reported that
graduate school admission should be based on criteria other
than letters of recommendation to a greater extent than sub-
Jects in the favorable treatment groups (unfavorable, 5c =
6.86; favorable, X = 5.98; F = k.59
t df = 1/83, £<.(*).
When the identity of the chosen candidate was included
in the analysis of variance, there was an interaction be-
tween that variable, finality of decision, and favorability
of the event (F = 6.0?, df = 1/75, £<.02) on the rated
importance of the statement of purpose. The means for the
interaction appear in Table 27. When subjects were appor-
tioned on the basis of finality of decision and identity of
the chosen candidate, simple effects tests demonstrated that
favorability of the event was only differentially effective
for subjects in the final decision treatment groups who
chose Behrend (F = 9.1*1, df = 1/75, £<.003). Specifically,
subjects in the unfavorable conditions reported that graduate
school admission should be based on criteria other than
statements of purpose to a greater extent than subjects in
the favorable conditions. Moreover, when subjects were appor-
tioned on the basis of favorability of the event and identity
of the chosen candidate, simple effects tests demonstrated
that finality of the decision was only differentially effective
for subjects in the favorable treatment groups who chose
Behrend (F = 7.14, df = 1/75, £<.009). That is, subjects
who made tentative decisions reported that graduate school
111.
admission should be based on criteria other than statements
of purpose to a greater extent than subjects who made final
decisions
.
Insert Table 27 about here
Subj ects' reactions to the "lflte" ipt-.ter of recommen-
dations
.
All of the measures in this category demonstrated
differences between subjects in the unfavorable and favorable
treatment groups. The findings relevant to these comparisons
appear in Table 28. Analyses of a number of these measures
also yielded differential effects of hindsight and finality
of decision.
Insert Table 28 about here
The information in the "late" letter was reported to
be more biased by subjects in the unfavorable treatment
groups than by subjects in the favorable treatment groups.
Also, subjects in unfavorable treatment groups indicated
that the information in the letter should be given less
importance than subjects in favorable treatment groups.
Subjects in unfavorable treatment groups reported that
the writer of the "late" letter was more biased than did sub-
jects in favorable treatment groups. The analysis of the
data (see Table 29) also revealed an interaction between
hindsight and finality of the decision (P = k.9k, df = l/83,
£^•03). Simple effects tests demonstrated that only for no
hindsight conditions were finality of decision conditions
differentially effective (F 8.38, df 1/83, £<.005).
Specifically, subjects who made final decisions indicated a
greater degree of bias than subjects who made tentative deci-
sions. There was also a tendency (jd^.06) for subjects in
final decision-hindsight treatment groups to report less bias
than subjects in final decision-no hindsight treatment groups.
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TABLE 2?
Mean Ratings of the Importance of Statements of
Purpose as an Admission Criteria (Pooled Over
Hindsight Conditions)
Chosen Favorable Event Unfavorable Event
Candidate
Final Tentative Final Tentative
Behrend ^.30 6.79 7.25 6.55
Stevenson 7.08 6.18 6.00 6.80
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TABLE 28
The Effect of Favorable and Unfavorable Events
on Subjects' Reactions to the "Late" Letter of
Recommendation (Pooled Over Decision And Hind-
sight Conditions)
Dependent
Variable Favorable Unfavorable Fa
Biased
Information 3.89 5.4l 13.78**
Important
Document 6.64 6.02 4.5^*
Biased
Writer 4,51 5.98 12.41**
Changed View 3.53 5.98 25.05**
M New"
Information 5.87 3.28 34.89**
* £ <. 04
** £<.001
a Significance levels of F values were assessed
with df = 1/83.
Insert Table 29 about here
In addition to demonstrating that subjects in unfavor-
able treatment groups reported that the information in the
-late" letter changed their view of the candidate more than
subjects in favorable treatment groups, the analysis revealed
a main effect of hindsight (F = 5.75, df = 1/83 f £<.02).
Specifically, subjects in high hindsight groups reported that
the information changed their view less (X = 4.09) than sub-
jects in no hindsight groups (X = 5.33).
Subjects in the unfavorable treatment groups reported
that the information was "newer" than subjects in the favor-
able treatment groups. Even though the analysis yielded an
interaction between favorability of the event and hindsight
(P b 4.52, df « 1/83, £<.04), simple effects tests demon-
strated that the favorability effect was consistent across
both levels of hindsight (£<*006). The means for the inter-
action appear in Table 30. The analysis also revealed that
the hindsight treatments were differentially effective (F
5.36, df 1/83, £<.02). However, tests of the simple ef-
fects of the interaction between hindsight and favorability
of the event demonstrated that only for the favorable treat-
ment groups were hindsight treatments, in fact, differentially
effective (F = 9.52, df = 1/83, £<.003). Specifically, sub-
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TABLE 29
Mean Ratings of Degree of Bias of the
Writer of the "Late" Letter (Pooled
Over Favorability Conditions)
Decision Hindsight utHindsight
Final 5.00 6. 09
Tentative 5.35 ^.^3
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jects in high hindsight conditions reported that the infor-
mation was not as
-new" as did subjects in no hindsight con-
ditions.
Insert Table 30 about here
The subject's Impressi on of her initial decision .
Subjects in unfavorable treatment groups reported less re-
sponsibility for their decision than subjects in favorable
treatment groups (F = 4.86, df = l/83, £<. 03). Yet favor-
ability of the event and hindsight interacted (P = 5.26,
df « 1/83, jd<.02) indicating that the differential effect
of favorabillty of the event was limited to high hindsight
conditions, where it was highly significant by a simple ef-
fects test (P 9.«96, df - i/83, £<.002). The means for
the interaction appear in Table 31. Additional simple ef-
fects tests demonstrated that only for favorable treatment
groups were hindsight treatments differentially effective
(F * 6.99, df = 1/83, £<.0l). That is, subjects in high
hindsight conditions reported greater responsibility than
subjects in no hindsight conditions.
Insert Table 31 about here
117.
TABLE 30
Mean Ratings of the "Newness" of the
Information (Pooled Over Decision
Conditions)
Event Hindsight „. No^ Hindsight
Favorable 6,77 ^.93
Unfavorable 3.33 3.2^
TABLE 31
Mean Ratings of Subjects' Responsibility
(Pooled Over Decision Conditions)
Event Hindsight „. . .& Hindsight
Favorable 7.13 5.35
Unfavorable ^.95 5.39
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Subjects in unfavorable treatment groups reported less
confidence in their decision than subjects in favorable
treatment groups (P = 6.16, df = 1/83, £ <.02). There was
also an interaction between favorability of the event, hind-
sight, and finality of the decision (F = 3.96, df = 1/83,
£<.05). The means for the interaction appear in Table 32.
When subjects were apportioned on the basis of hindsight and
finality of the decision, simple effects tests indicated that
the differential effects of favorability of the event were
limited to subjects in the final decision-hindsight conditions
(P 3.95, df = 1/83, £<.05) and subjects in the tentative
decision-no hindsight conditions (P = 6. 31, df - 1/83, £<.01)
Additional simple effects tests demonstrated that only
for no hindsight-unfavorable treatment groups were finality of
decision treatments differentially effective (P = k.6b
t df
1/83 1 £<»03). That is, subjects who made a final decision
reported greater confidence than subjects who made a tentative
decision.
Insert Table 32 about here
When identity of the chosen candidate was added as a
factor in the analysis, there was a significant interaction
between that variable, hindsight, and finality of the decision
120.
TABLE 32
Mean Ratings of Subjects' Confidence
in Their Initial Decision
Final Tentative
Event
Hindsight
Hin
N°
ight Hindsight ^
Favorable 6.83
Unfavorable 5.10
5.60
5.85
6.15
4.00
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(F a 8.85, df 1/75, £<.004). The means for the interaction
appear in Table 33. When subjects were apportioned on the
basis of finality of decision and identity of the chosen can-
didate, simple effects tests demonstrated that only in ten-
tative decision conditions when Behrend was top-choice were
hindsight treatments differentially effective (P = 4.95,
df = 1/75, JB<.03). Specifically, subjects in high hind-
sight treatment groups reported greater confidence than sub-
jects in no hindsight treatment groups. A similar but weaker
(£<.07) effect was found for subjects who chose Stevenson
in final decision conditions.
Additional simple effects tests demonstrated that only
when Stevenson was the top-choice of subjects in high hind-
sight conditions was finality of decision differentially ef-
fective (F = 5.57, df = 1/75, £<.02). Specifically, sub-
jects who made final decisions reported greater confidence
than subjects who made tentative decisions.
Insert Table 33 about here
In summary, the analyses of subjects 1 ratings of their
confidence demonstrated that the differential effects of
favorability of the event were limited to subjects in both
final decision-hindsight conditions and tentative decision-
122.
TABLE 33
Mean Ratings of Subjects' Confidence in Their
Initial Decision (Pooled Over Pavorability
Conditions)
Chosen Final Tentative
Candidate No „. , . no"Hindsight
„, Hindsight „ No& Hindsight mubigni, Hindsight
Behrend 5.50 6.^2 6.85 5. 08
Stevenson 6.50 5. 00 4.50 5.36
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no hindsight conditions. Moreover, the differential effects
of finality of decision were limited to subjects both in no
hindsight-unfavorable treatments, and high hindsight con-
ditions when Stevenson was top-choice. Lastly the differ-
ential effects of hindsight were restricted to tentative deci-
sion conditions when Behrend was top-choice.
Change of Decision
At the conclusion of the study, subjects were offered
an opportunity to change their initial decisions. Subjects
in final decision treatments were told that they were being
afforded the opportunity because it seemed unfair to compare
their initial decisions with the faculty's recent consider-
ations which were, in part, based on the use of the "late"
information. Subjects in tentative decision treatments were
simply asked to make a final decision. Hypotheses lc, 2a,
3b, and 4a each concern subjects 1 responses on this measure.
The numbers of subjects who changed and did not change their
decisions in each experimental condition are reported in
Table 3^.
Insert Table 3^ about here
Hypothesis lc concerns the impact of an unfavorable
event on subjects who have made a final decision and who
124.
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have, or do not have, hindsight. It proposes that subjects
with hindsight will change their decisions less than sub-
jects without hindsight. The Fisher Exact Probability Test
(Siegel, 1956) failed to support this hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2a concerns the impact of an unfavorable
event on subjects who have made a tentative decision and
who have, or do not have, hindsight. It proposes that sub-
jects with and without hindsight will be equally inclined
to change their decisions. In fact, subjects were about
equally inclined to change their decisions.
Hypothesis 3b concerns the impact of a favorable event
on subjects who have made a final decision and who have, or
do not have, hindsight. It proposes that subjects with and
without hindsight will be equally inclined (not) to change
their decisions. In fact, subjects in both conditions did
not change their decisions.
Lastly Hypothesis ^a concerns the impact of a favorable
event on subjects who have made a tentative decision and
who have, or do not have, hindsight. It proposes that sub-
jects will be equally inclined (not) to change their deci-
sions. In fact, subjects in both conditions did not change
their decisions.
A chi square test showed that subjects in unfavorable
conditions changed their decisions more than subjects in
favorable conditions (X2 = 2^.79, df = 1, jd^.001 by two-
tailed test). The chi square for the comparison between
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final and tentative decision groups was not significant.
Nor was the chi square significant for the comparison between
hindsight treatments.
Internal Analysis: Assignment to conditions
The previously reported findings suggest that hindsight
had little consistent effect on evaluations of the candidates.
However, it is to be recalled that the hindsight manipulation
produced low levels of hindsight when the fait accompli event
was negative, and that hindsight and favorability of the event
were, therefore, confounded.
In an effort to overcome this problem, subjects were as-
signed to hindsight conditions based on their responses to
the manipulation check item. The necessity for this internal
analysis was anticipated in Hypothesis 9. Of the 91 exper-
imental subjects, **9 used positions 1-6 on the scale, and k2
used positive 7-9. Accordingly, subjects who rated their
hindsight in positions 1-6 were assigned to low hindsight
conditions, while subjects who rated their hindsight in posi-
tions 7-9 were assigned to high hindsight conditions. Unfor-
tunately the assignment resulted in rather small Ns in some
cells. The identity of the chosen candidate was not included
as a factor in the ensuing analyses as it would have reduced
the Ns in some cells to an intolerable level.
The results of the internal analysis are important to
the extent that they provide new information about how re-
sponses are affected by the variables. Although some of the
findings that parallel earlier results will be cited in this
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section, greater attention will be given to results that
supplement earlier findings or are different from them.
Internal Analysis: Manipulation checks
As might be anticipated, subjects in high hindsight
conditions reported greater hindsight than subjects in low
hindsight conditions (P = 237.23, df = 1/83, £<.001). How-
ever, the levels of hindsight are still not independent of
the favorability of the event treatments. Subjects in favor-
able conditions reported greater hindsight than subjects in
unfavorable conditions (P = 16. 26, df = 1/83, £<.001). But,
tests of the simple effects demonstrated that this differen-
tial effect of favorability of the event was limited to low
hindsight conditions (F = 19.82, df = 1/83, £<.001). Subjects'
mean responses on the hindsight measure appear in Table 35.
Insert Table 35 about here
The finality of decision manipulation was effective.
And, as was the case with the analysis of manipulated hind-
sight, subjects in unfavorable conditions reported a greater
likelihood of being allowed to change than subjects in favor-
able treatment groups.
Internal Analysis: Difference scores
Evaluative items
. Hypotheses 1,2,3, and 4 lead to the
128.
TABLE 35
Mean Ratings of Hindsight
(Pooled Over Decision Conditions)
Event High Low
Hindsight Hindsight
Favorable 7.89 i+,60
(I5) a (29)
Unfavorable 7.^7 3.14
(27) (20)
a The numbers in parantheses correspond
to the number of subjects.
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expectation that the difference scores on the evaluative
items will be lower and more negative for unfavorable treat,
ments than for favorable treatments, unless that event is
received after a final decision and with hindsight. No
specific prediction was offered about the latter condition.
To test the hypotheses, scores of the three unfavorable
treatment groups were pooled and compared with the pooled
scores of the three favorable treatment groups. (The final
decision-hindsight treatment group was not included in either
pooled score.) The differences were significant and in the
proposed direction. The effects occurred on the same measures
as were used in the analysis of manipulated hindsight (see
Table 6).
From the four hypotheses, it was also expected that the
impact of hindsight would be mediated by the finality of the
decision and the favorability of the event. No such triple
interaction was found.
The analyses, however, yielded a significant main effect
of hindsight on the ratings of graduate school potential
(F = 7.91, df = 1/83, £<.006). Specifically, subjects in
high hindsight treatment groups had a greater positive dif-
ference score than subjects in low hindsight treatment groups.
(There was a similar but weaker (£<.07) effect on originality.)
In addition, the analyses of the graduate school potential
measure yielded a marginal interaction between hindsight and
finality of the decision (F = 3.^0, df 1/83, £<.0?). The
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means for the interaction appear in Table 36. Simple effects
tests demonstrated that the differential effect of hindsight
v/as limited to subjects in the tentative decision treatments
(£<.001). The analysis also revealed that the finality of
decision treatments were differentially effective at only a
marginal level (F = 3.73, df « 1/83, £<.06). However, tests
of the simple effects of the interaction between hindsight and
finality of the decision demonstrated that only for no hind-
sight treatments was finality of decision, in fact, differen-
tially effective (£<.00l). That is, subjects in final de-
cision treatments produced more positive difference scores
than subjects in tentative decision treatments.
Insert Table 36 about here
Difference scores on items dealing; with the Importance
of the candidates' academic credentials for subjects' ratings
.
An analysis of the ratings of the importance of standardized
tests yielded a significant interaction between finality of
decision and hindsight (P = 5.03, df « 1/83, j><.03). This
same interaction, with a similar patterning of the means,
appeared on the analysis of manipulated hindsight (see Table 8).
Comparisons of the difference scores of Control and Exper-
imental subjects
.
Hypotheses 5,6,7, and 8 each concern a
131.
TABLE 36
Difference Scores on Graduate School Potential
Event
Final Tentative
Hindsight No
Hindsight Hindsight
No
Hindsight
1.33
Favorable 2.61 2.30 2.95
(U) a (11) (16) (9)
Unfavorable
.08
-.09
-.29
-1.35
(9) (6) (15)
a The numbers in parantheses correspond to the
number of subjects.
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comparison between one of the final decision treatments and
the control group. The rationale for the limited nature of
these comparisons has been offered previously. Since each
of the hypotheses is concerned with comparisons of difference
scores on evaluative items, those that are significant will
be reported together. The findings for the analyses were
similar to the findings for the analyses based on subjects 1
manipulated hindsight (see Table 13).
Hypothesis 5 concerns the impact of an unfavorable event
on subjects who have made a final decision and have hindsight.
It proposes that there will be a greater positive difference
score for subjects in the experimental condition than for
subjects in the control group. The differences between the
means on originality and graduate school potential were sig-
nificant but in the direction opposite to that proposed.
Hypothesis 6 concerns the impact of an unfavorable event
on subjects who have made a final decision and have no hind-
sight. It proposes that there will be a greater positive
difference score for subjects in the control group than for
subjects in the experimental condition. The differences be-
tween the means on originality and graduate school potential
were significant and in the proposed direction.
Hypothesis 7 concerns the impact of a favorable event
on subjects who have made a final decision and have hind-
sight. It proposes that the difference scores will be com-
parable for the experimental and control groups. The means
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were significantly different; thus it appears that hindsight
did have an effect on the difference scores after all.
Hypothesis 8 concerns the impact of a favorable event
on subjects who have made a final decision and have no hind-
sight. It proposes that there will be a larger positive
difference score for subjects in the experimental group than
for subjects in the control group. The means were signifi-
cantly different and in the proposed direction.
The effect found for the difference scores on the
importance of standardized tests when the analysis was per-
formed on manipulated hindsight also appeared when the data
for reported hindsight were analyzed. That is, for favor-
able treatments, the high hindsight group mean differed from
the control group mean, which did not differ from the low
hindsight group mean.
In summary, the internal analysis of the difference
scores on the evaluative items reveals two new findings.
First, hindsight treatments are differentially effective
only for subjects who make tentative decisions. Secondly,
finality of decision treatments are differentially effective
only for subjects in low hindsight conditions.
Internal Analysis: Chosen candidate
Evaluative items . Hypotheses lb, 2,3, and ^ lead to
the expectation that subjects in unfavorable treatments will
evaluate the chosen candidate less favorably than subjects
in favorable treatments, unless the event is received after a
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was
scores
final decision and with hindsight. No specific prediction
offered about that condition. To test the hypotheses,
of the three unfavorable treatment groups were pooled and
compared with the pooled scores of the three favorable treat-
ment groups. (The final decision-hindsight treatment group
was not included in either pooled sample.) The differences
were significant and in the proposed direction. The effects
occurred on the same measures as for the analysis of man-
ipulated hindsight (see Table lk) .
The predictions of Hypothesis lb concerning any item
depend upon how securely the item is based on "reality".
That is, on items for which "reality" is clear there should
be no difference between hindsight conditions for the final
decision-unfavorable treatments, while hindsight treatments
should differ on items for which "reality" is unclear. This
distinction leads to the expectation that when the four hy-
potheses are tested in one analysis, outcomes should differ
for the two types of items only in final decision-unfavorable
event conditions. For both types of items, hindsight treat-
ments should not differ for either tentative decision con-
dition, and might or might no differ for the final decision-
favorable treatment groups. Therefore, it was expected that
the impact of hindsight would be mediated by the finality of
the decision, and by the favorability of the event on items
tapping a less secure basis of "reality" (e.g., graduate
school potential). On the other hand, items which tap a
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relatively secure conception of
-reality" (e.g., originality)
might show no effects of hindsight. Or, if the hindsight
treatments differ for final decision-favorable event groups,
the impact of hindsight might be mediated by the finality of
the decision, and the favorability of the event.
No item for which "reality" was unclear demonstrated
that hindsight was mediated by the finality of the decision,
or by the favorability of the event. However, there was a
main effect of hindsight on ratings of graduate school po-
tential, an item for which "reality" is unclear, (F = 4.77,
df
- 1/83, £<.03). Specifically, subjects receiving high
hindsight conditions evaluated the chosen candidate more
favorably than subjects in low hindsight conditions. Even
though the interaction between hindsight and finality of the
decision was not significant (F<l), simple effects tests
demonstrated that the hindsight treatments were only dif-
ferentially effective for subjects in tentative decision
treatment groups (o<.00l). The means for the interaction
appear in Table 37.
Insert Table 37 about here
Similar findings were also found on originality, an
item which is more securely based in '"reality" (see Table 370.
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That is, subjects in high hindsight conditions evaluated
the chosen candidate more favorably than subjects in low
hindsight conditions (P = 6.C*, df «= 1/83, £<.02). Yet,
the analysis yielded a marginal interaction between hindsight
and finality of the decision (P * 3.10, df « 1/83, n<.08)
suggesting that the effect of hindsight was limited only to
the tentative decision treatments, where it was highly sig-
nificant by a simple effects test (P = 33.06, df = 1/83,
£<.001).
Additional simple effects tests of the interaction
between hindsight and finality of the decision on ratings
of originality indicated that only for low hindsight con-
ditions were finality of decision treatments differentially
effective (P = 6A7, df = l/83, £<.0l). That is, subjects
in final decision conditions evaluated the chosen alternative
more positively than subjects in tentative decision conditions
The importance of the chosen candidate's academic cre-
dentials for subjects' ratings. An analysis of subjects'
responses to the scales in this category yielded significant
or marginal effects for all of the items: l) the importance
of standardized tests, 2) the importance of the statement of
purpose, 3) transcript importance, and the importance of
the filed letters. In general these analyses indicated that
on some measures hindsight and finality of the decision had
differential effects without limiting conditions, while on
other measures each had differential effects only with limit-
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ing conditions.
Subjects receiving the high hindsight conditions reported
that the candidate's standardized test scores were more im-
portant than subjects receiving low hindsight conditions
(high hindsight, X = 5.76; low hindsight, X = 5.02; P = 6.08,
df = 1/83, £<.02). m addition, subjects in final decision
treatment groups reported that the standardized tests were
less important than subjects in tentative decision treatment
groups. The latter finding had also occurred when the data
for manipulated hindsight were analyzed, while the former did
not.
The analysis yielded a significant interaction between
hindsight and favorability on the importance of the statement
of purpose (F = 3-95, df = l/83, £<.05). The same interaction
with a similar patterning of the means appeared on the analy-
sis of manipulated hindsight (see Table 18).
A marginal interaction between hindsight and favorability
was found on transcript importance (F = 3.72, df 1/83,
£<.06). Although the means patterned similarly to those of
the significant interaction yielded when the data for man-
ipulated hindsight were analyzed (see Table 18), the results
from the simple effects tests differed. For both analyses
hindsight was differentially effective for subjects in
favorable event treatment groups. However, in the internal
analysis, favorability treatments were not found to be dif-
ferentially effective for subjects in high hindsight conditions.
139.
Analysis of the ratings of importance of the filed
letters yielded a marginal interaction between hindsight
and finality of the decision (P = 3.56, df = 1/83, je<.06).
Tests of the simple effects indicated that only with sub-
jects in high hindsight conditions were finality of decision
treatments differentially effective ( fi <.05). That is, sub-
jects in final decision conditions reported that the filed
letters were more important than subjects in tentative
decision conditions. This effect had not been noted when
the data for manipulated hindsight were analyzed.
Comparisons between Control and Experimental ratios.
Hypotheses 5b, 6a, and 7 each concern a comparison between
one of the final decision treatments and the control group.
The rationale for the limited nature of these comparisons
has been offered previously. Since each of the hypotheses
is concerned with comparisons of the ratings on evaluative
items, those that are significant will be reported together.
The findings for these analyses were similar to the findings
for the analyses based on subjects' manipulated hindsight
(see Table 19 and pp. 92-5). There was one exception to
this similarity between the two analyses. The significant
effect for teaching potential reported in Table 19 occurred
when the identity of the chosen candidate was added as a
factor, it is not clear whether this effect would have been
duplicated. However, the internal analysis did show a
marginal effect (£ < .07) without the identity of the
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chosen candidate as a factor.
Hypothesis 5b concerns the impact of an unfavorable
event on subjects who have made a final decision and have
hindsight. However, its predictions depend upon how securely
an item is based on "reality". That is, the chosen candidate
will be more favorably evaluated by subjects in the experi-
mental group than the control group on items tapping a less
secure conception of "reality" (e.g., graduate school poten-
tial), but the chosen candidate will be less favorably eval-
uated by subjects in the experimental group than the control
group on items for which "reality" is clearer (e.g., original-
ity). The differences between the means on originality were
significant and in the direction predicted. Although the
difference between the means on graduate school potential was
significant, the direction was opposite to that proposed.
Hypothesis 6a concerns the impact of an unfavorable event
on subjects who have made a final decision and have no hind-
sight. It proposes that the chosen candidate will be less
favorably evaluated by subjects in the experimental condition
than by subjects in the control group. The differences be-
tween the means on originality and graduate school potential
were significant and in the proposed direction.
Hypothesis 7a concerns the impact of a favorable event on
subjects who have made a final decision and have hindsight.
It proposes that the attractiveness of the chosen candidate
will be comparable for the experimental and control groups.
lM.
There was a marginal difference between the means on graduate
school potential, suggesting that perhaps hindsight does
influence ratings after all.
No specific hypothesis was offered about the impact of
a favorable event on subjects who have made a final decision
and have no hindsight. However, it was tentatively suggested
that the chosen candidate might be more favorably evaluated
by subjects in the experimental group than by subjects in
the control group. There was a significant difference be-
tween the means on graduate school potential supporting the
suggestion.
Comparisons between Control and Experimental ^nn^ nn
the importance of the chosen candidate's academic credentials
for subjects' ratings
. A one-factor least-squares analyses
between high hindsight, low hindsight, and control conditions
for the unfavorable treatments yielded a significant effect
on the scores of the importance of standardized tests (P = 3.37,
df « 2/37, £4-05). Dunnett's test revealed that the high
hindsight group mean (X = 6.17) did not differ significantly
from the control group mean (X = 5.91; d<l), while the low
hindsight group mean (X = 4.68) did differ significantly from
the control group mean (d = 2.20, df 3/37, jd<.05).
Also a similar one-factor least-squares analysis for the
favorable treatments yielded a marginal effect on the scores
dealing with the importance of standardized tests (F 3.12,
df = 2/37, jd<.06). Dunnett's test revealed that the high
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con-
hindsight group mean (X = 5.32) did not differ from the
trol group mean (X = 5 .91 ; d<l), while the low hindsight
group mean (X
- 4.23) did differ significantly from the con-
trol group mean (d<.025).
The analysis for the favorable treatments yielded a sig-
nificant effect on the scores of the importance of the state-
ment of purpose (F « 4.11, df « 2/36, £<.03). Dunnetfs test
revealed that the high hindsight group mean (X = 8.18) did not
differ from the control group mean (X = 8j0£>, d<l), while the
low hindsight group mean (X = 6.82) did differ significantly
from the control group mean (d = 2.^7, df = 3/36, £<.025).
The findings which have just been reported were unique to
the analysis of reported hindsight. A finding common to both
analyses was the significant effect of hindsight on ratings of
transcript importance made by subjects who received the favor-
able treatments. It was again demonstrated that the high
hindsight treatment group did not differ from the control
group, which differed from the low hindsight treatment group.
In summary, the internal analysis of the evaluations of
the chosen candidate revealed that the effects found when
the data for manipulated hindsight were analyzed were not
limited to favorable conditions. Thus while the internal analy-
sis revealed that only for subjects in tentative decision
treatments was hindsight differentially effective on originality,
in the analysis of manipulated hindsight this effect was re-
stricted to favorable treatments. Similarly where the internal
1^3.
analysis revealed that only for sheets in low hindslght 00a.
ditlons were finality of decision treatments differentially
effective, previously this effect was restrioted to favorable
treatments. There were, however, two exceptions to this
generalization. The Internal analysis of graduate school po-
tential did demonstrate that hindsight was differentially ef-
fective only for subjects in tentative decision treatment
groups; however, the analysis of manipulated hindsight indi-
cated that this effect was significant only for favorable
treatments and when Behrend was the chosen candidate. Also
the analysis of manipulated hindsight yielded a differential
effect on hindsight for final decision-unfavorable treatments
when Stevenson was top-choice. Since the data for the re-
ported hindsight were not analyzed with the identity of the
chosen candidate as a factor, it is not clear whether these
exceptions would have occurred.
The analyses of the scales concerned with the importance
of the candidate's academic credentials for subjects' ratings
produced some new findings which have already been described.
Specifically there was a differential effect of hindsight on
the importance of standardized tests, a differential effect
of finality of decision on the Importance of the filed let-
ters for subjects in high hindsight conditions, and a failure
to find a differential effect of favorability on transcript
Importance for subjects in high hindsight conditions. Com-
parisons between subjects in final decision conditions and
1M.
subjects in the control group generally indicated that the
subjects in low hindsight conditions differed from subjects
in the control group who did not differ from subjects in
high hindsight conditions.
Internal Analysis: Nonchosen candidate
Evaluative items. Hypotheses la, 2, 3a, and k lead to
the expectation that subjects in unfavorable treatments will
evaluate the nonchosen candidate more favorably than sub-
jects in favorable treatments, unless the event is received
after a final decision and with hindsight. No specific pre-
diction was offered about the latter condition. To test
the hypotheses, scores of the three unfavorable treatment
groups were pooled and compared with the pooled scores of
the three favorable treatment groups. (The final decision-
hindsight treatment group was not included in either pooled
sample.) The differences were significant and in the pro-
posed direction. The effects occurred on the same measures
as for the analysis of manipulated hindsight (see Table 20)
with only one minor difference. For the internal analysis the
difference between the favorable and unfavorable treatments
was only marginal (£^.06) for teaching potential.
The four hypotheses led to the expectation that the
effectiveness of hindsight would be mediated by the finality
of the decision and the favorability of the event. No such
effect was found.
However, the internal analysis did yield main effects of
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finality of decision on graduate school potential and af-
fability that were similar to those found when the data for
manipulated hindsight were analyzed. In addition, there was
a marginal main effect of hindsight on graduate school po-
tential (P = 3 .45 , df = 1/83, £<.07). That is, subjects in
high hindsight conditions reported a lower evaluation of the
nonchosen candidate (X = 4.98) than subjects in low hindsight
conditions (X = 5.78). Although the interaction between
hindsight and finality of the decision was weak (d <.12),
the effect of hindsight was more pronounced in the tentative
decision treatment group.
The importance of the candidate's academic credentials
for subjects' ratings
. An analysis of subjects' responses
to the scales in this category yielded significant effects
for three of the items: l) transcript importance, 2) the
importance of the filed letter, and 3) the importance of
standardized tests. These analyses indicated that hindsight
and finality of the decision each had general effects as
well as more limited effects. Favorability of the event,
on the other hand, had only general effects.
Subjects in high hindsight conditions reported that the
candidate's transcript was more important than subjects in
low hindsight conditions (high hindsight, X = 7.12; low hind-
sight, X 6.49; P = 4.38, df = 1/83, £<.04). When the
data for manipulated hindsight were analyzed, this effect
occurred only for subjects in favorable treatment groups.
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Also the internal analysis did not demonstrate, as did the
analysis of manipulated hindsight, a differential effect of
favorability for the no hindsight treatment groups.
The analysis yielded a significant interaction between
hindsight and finality of the decision on the importance of
the filed letters (P = 4.'74, df . 1/83, £<.03). Although
the means patterned similarly to those of the significant
interaction found when the data for manipulated hindsight
were analyzed (see Table 24) , the results from the simple
effects tests differed. For both analyses finality of deci-
sion was differentially effective for subjects in high hind-
sight conditions. However, only on the internal analysis
and then only for subjects in final decision treatment groups,
were hindsight treatments differentially effective (F = 6.66,
df = 1/83, £<.01). That is, subjects in high hindsight con-
ditions reported that the filed letters were more important -
than subjects in low hindsight conditions.
.
Findings unique to the internal analysis occurred on
the importance of standardized tests. Subjects in unfavor-
able treatment groups reported that standardized tests were
more important than subjects in favorable treatment groups
(unfavorable, X = 5.59, favorable, X = 5.07; F = 4.94, df =
1/83, P.^»03). In addition, subjects in high hindsight con-
ditions reported that the standardized tests were more im-
portant than subjects in low hindsight conditions (high hind-
sight, X = 5.74, low hindsight, X = 4.97; F = 7.22, df = 1/83,
iSS
;s
£<.009 ). Finally, subjects in final decision treatment
groups tended to report that standardized tests were le
important than subjects in tentative decision treatment*
(final, X = 5.02; tentative, X = 5.62; P = 3.29, df = 1/83,
£<.07).
Comparisons bet™*™ r.^^i ^ Experimental ratings .
Hypotheses 5a, 7, and 8 each concern a comparison between
one of the final decision conditions and the control group.
The rationale for the limited nature of these comparisons
has been offered previously. Since each of the hypotheses is
concerned with comparisons of the ratings on evaluative items,
those that are significant will be reported together. The
findings for these analyses were similar to the findings for
the analyses based on manipulated hindsight (see Table 25 and
pp. 106-109) unless otherwise noted.
Hypothesis 5a concerns the impact of an unfavorable
event on subjects who have made a final decision and have
hindsight. It proposes that the nonchosen candidate will be
more negatively evaluated by the experimental group than the
control group. However, the difference between the means was
not significant.
No specific hypothesis was offered about the impact of
an unfavorable event on subjects who have made a final deci-
sion and have no hindsight. Yet it was tentatively suggested
that the nonchosen candidate might be more favorably eval-
uated by subjects in the experimental group than by subjects
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in the control group. However, the difference between the
means was not significant.
Hypothesis 7 concerns the impact of a favorable event
on subjects who have made a final decision and have hindsight.
It proposes that the nonchosen candidate should not be posi-
tively evaluated by either the experimental or the control
group, and that these treatment groups should not be dif-
ferent from each other. The differences between the means
were significant for originality and graduate school potential
but not competitiveness.
Hypothesis 8a concerns the impact of a favorable event
on subjects who have made a final decision and have no hind-
sight. It proposes that the nonchosen candidate will be less
positively evaluated by subjects in the experimental treat-
ment group than by subjects in the control group. The dif-
ference between means on originality, graduate school potential,
and competitiveness were significant and in the predicted
direction.
Also a one-factor least-squares analysis between high
hindsight, low hindsight, and control conditions for the
favorable treatment groups yielded a significant effect on
the affability ratings [F = 3.18, df - 2/36, £<.05). This
effect did not appear when the data for manipulated hindsight
were analyzed. Dunnett's tests revealed that the high hind-
sight group mean (X = 4.96) differed significantly from the
control group mean (X = 5.91; d = 3/36, df 2/36, £<.025)
1^9.
which differed only marginally from the low hindsight group
mean (X = 5.21; d = 1. 75 , df = 3/36, 2> .05 ). This analysis
does not offer clear support for either Hypothesis 7 or 8a.
The internal analysis yielded effects on transcript
importance and the importance of standardized tests that
paralleled those generated by the analysis of manipulated
hindsight (see Table 26).
In summary, the internal analysis yielded four new find-
ings concerning the differential effects of hindsight. First,
there was a marginal effect of hindsight on graduate school
potential. Secondly, there was a differential effect of
hindsight on the importance of the filed letters only for
subjects in final decision treatment groups. Thirdly, there
was a significant effect of hindsight on the importance of
the standardized tests measure. Fourthly, the effect of
hindsight on the importance of the candidate's transcript
was not restricted to favorable treatment groups as it was
when the data for manipulated hindsight were analyzed.
In addition, the internal analysis did not show the
differential effect of favorability of the event on transcript
importance for subjects with no hindsight which occurred when
tjhe data for manipulated hindsight were analyzed. The inter-
nal analysis also yielded significant effects of favorability
of the event, and marginal effects of finality of the deci-
sion on the importance of standardized tests. And lastly,
comparisons between final decision-favorable treatment groups
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and the control group revealed that, on affability, subjects
in the high hindsight condition differed significantly from
subjects in the control group, who differed only marginally
from subjects in the no hindsight condition.
Internal Analysis: Findings on other dependent measures
The importance of graduate school admission criteria .
As was the case when the data for manipulated hindsight were
analyzed, subjects in the unfavorable treatment groups re-
ported that graduate school admission should be based on
criteria other than letters of recommendation to a greater
extent than did subjects in the favorable treatment groups.
The other findings on the scales in this category were
unique to the internal analysis. Subjects in final decision
treatment groups tended to report that graduate school admis-
sion should be based on criteria other than standardized tests
(F « 3.20, df 1/83, £<.08). The analysis also yielded a
marginal interaction between hindsight and finality of the
decision on the item assessing the importance of accepting
students of lower academic ability when they have an ability
to relate to undergraduate problems (F = 3.36, df = 1/83,
£ <.07). Tests of the simple effects indicated that
only for
subjects in high hindsight conditions were finality of deci-
sion conditions differentially effective (£ <.03). That is,
subjects in final decision treatment groups reported that it
was less important to accept such a candidate than subjects
in tentative decision treatment groups.
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Subjects' reactions to the "late - letter of recommendation .
The information in the
-late" letter was reported to be more
biased by subjects in the unfavorable treatment groups than
by subjects in the favorable treatment groups (F = 10.86,
df 1.83, £ <.001). However, the analysis revealed an inter-
action between favorability
,
hindsight, and finality of the
decision (F = 4.53, df = 1/83, The means for the
interaction appear in Table 38. When subjects were appor-
tioned on the basis of hindsight and finality of the decision,
simple effects tests demonstrated that favorability of the
event had differential effects for two of the comparisons. The
effect of favorability of the event was significant for sub-
jects in final decision-low hindsight conditions (F = 5.84,
df 1/83, 2<» 02 ) and for subjects in the tentative decision-
high hindsight conditions (F = 10.35, df 1/83, ]><.002).
Subjects in high hindsight conditions tended to report
that the information in the letter was less biased than sub-
jects in low hindsight conditions (F 3.04, df 1/83, p_<.09).
However, there was a marginal interaction between hindsight
and finality of the decision (F = 3o42, df 1.83, p_<.07)
as well as the significant triple interaction. Tests of
the simple effects demonstrated that hindsight conditions
were differentially effective only for subjects in final deci-
sion-unfavorable treatments (F = 5.91, df 1/83, p^.02).
Additional simple effects tests demonstrated that finality
of decision treatments were differentially effective for sub-
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Jects in high hindsight-unfavorable treatment groups (P = k.07t
« = 1/83, £ <.05). That is, subjects in final decision treat-
ment groups reported that the information was less biased than
did subjects in tentative decision treatment groups. In ad-
dition, simple effects tests also demonstrated that finality
of decision treatments were differentially effective for sub-
jects in low hindsight-unfavorable treatment groups (P = ^12,
df
- 1/83, £ <.05). That is, subjects in final decision con-
ditions reported that the information was more biased than
subjects in tentative decision treatment groups.
Insert Table 38 about here
The findings for subjects* ratings of the degree of bias
of the writer of the "late" letter were similar to those just
discussed (see Table 38). Subjects in unfavorable treatment
groups reported that the writer of the "late" letter was more
biased than did subjects in favorable treatment groups (P =
9.60, df 1/83, £<.003). However, the analysis revealed an
interaction between favorability, hindsight, and finality of
the decision (F = 6.25, df
:
« 1/83, £<.01). When subjects
were apportioned on the basis of hindsight and finality of
the decision, simple effects tests demonstrated that favor-
ability of the event had differential effects for two of the
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comparisons. The effect of favorability of the event was
significant for subjects in final decision-low hindsight
conditions ( P . 11.27, df « 1/83, £ <.00l) and for subjects
in tentative decision-high hindsight conditions (F - 6.59,
df
- 1/83, 2<*01).
Subjects in high hindsight conditions reported that the
writer of the letter was less biased than subjects in low
hindsight conditions (P = 4.52, df » l/83 , £<.<*). However,
there was a significant interaction between hindsight and
finality of the decision (P * 3.91, df a 1/83> £ <#05) as
well as the signifcant triple interaction. Tests of the
simple effects demonstrated that the hindsight conditions
were differentially effective only for subjects in final
decision-unfavorable treatment groups (F = 9.15, df = 1/83,
2 <.003).
Additional simple effects tests demonstrated that finality
of decision treatments were differentially effective for sub-
jects in low hindsight-unfavorable conditions (P = 13. 96,
df = 1/83, £<.001). That is, subjects in final decision
conditions reported that the writer of the letter was more
biased than did subjects in tentative decision treatment
groups
.
Subjects in unfavorable treatment groups reported that
the information in the "late" letter changed their view of
the candidate more than subjects in favorable conditions
(P 21.30, df = 1/83, jo^.001). In addition, subjects in
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TABLE 39
Mean Ratings on the Letter's Influence to ChangeSuDjectsI Views of the Candidate (Pooled Over
Decision Conditions)
Event High Low
Hindsight Hindsight
Favorable 2. 74 l±,$o
Unfavorable 6.13 5.90
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TABLE ^0
SSSLSKV^ °n ^e Letter ' s Influence to ChangeSubjects' Views of the Candidate and the Impor-tance of the Letter (Pooled over Favorabil-
ity Conditions)
Ere*' Decision Z High LolT"weasure Hindsight Hindsight
Changed Final ^-50 ^.68
View
Tentative 3.^5 6.08
Importance Final 7.00 5.^0
of Letter mTentative 6.55 6.33
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high hindsight conditions tended to report that the infer,
mation in the "late- letter changed their view of the can-
didate less than subjects in low hindsight conditions (P =
3.37, df « 1/83, £<.07). However, the analysis yielded a
significant interaction between hindsight and favorability
of the event (P = df = 1/83, £<.04). The means for
the interaction appear in Table 39. Simple effects tests
demonstrated that the effect of favorability of the event
was quite general (os <.05). On the other hand, the effect
of hindsight was limited only to subjects in favorable treat-
ment groups (P n 7.76, df = 1/83, p.^.007).
There was also a significant interaction between hind-
sight and finality of the decision (P = 4.54, df 1/83,
£ <.04). The means for the interaction appear in Table 40,
Tests of the simple effects demonstrated that the effect of
hindsight was limited to subjects in tentative decision treat-
ment groups (F = 15.49, df = 1/83, £<.00l). Additional simple
effects tests demonstrated that only for subjects in low hind-
sight conditions were finality of the decision treatments dif-
ferentially effective (F = 4.71 , df = 1/83, £<.03). That is,
subjects in final decision treatment groups reported that in-
formation in the "late" letter changed their view of the can-
didate less than did subjects in the tentative decision treat-
ment groups.
Insert Tables 39 & 40 about here
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Subjects in high hindsight treatment groups reported
that the information in the letter should be given greater
importance than subjects in low hindsight treatments (F =
5.15, df = 1/83, £<.03). However, there was a significant
interaction between hindsight and finality of the decision
(P
- 4.67, df = 1/83, £<.03). The means for the inter-
action appear in Table 40. Tests of the simple effects
demonstrated that the effect of hindsight was limited only
to subjects in final decision treatment groups (F = 11.73,
df = 1/83, jb<.001).
Additional simple effects tests revealed that only for
subjects in the low hindsight condition was finality of
decision differentially effective (F 4.40, df = 1/83,
2<.04). That is, subjects in final decision treatment groups
reported that the information in the letter should be given
less importance than did subjects in tentative decision
treatment groups.
The information was reported to be less "new" by sub-
jects in the favorable treatment groups than by subjects in
the unfavorable treatment groups. In addition subjects in
high hindsight condition reported that the information was
less unew M than subjects in low hindsight conditions (high
hindsight, X = 5.77; low hindsight, X - 3.63; P * 14.67
,
df = 1/83, £<.001).
In summary, the internal analysis for each of these
items produced new findings. These new findings either
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limited the effects found when the data for manipulated hind-
sight were analyzed, or made the effects more general, or,
in some cases, were totally new*
The main effect of favorability of the event which the
analysis on manipulated hindsight yielded on the degree of
bias of the information in the "late" letter and of the
writer of the information, were no longer general. In ad-
dition, the main effect did not occur on the importance of
the letter when the data for reported hindsight were analyzed.
For final decision-unfavorable event groups hindsight
conditions were found to have differential effects on the
degree of bias of the information in the "late" letter and of
the writer of the letter. The effect for the former was new,
whereas the effect for the latter was more limited; i.e.,
previously the effect had not been restricted to unfavorable
treatments. In addition, the internal analysis yielded
general effects of hindsight on the measure dealing with
the "newness" of the information, and limited the effects
of hindsight on the measure dealing with the letter's in-
fluence in changing subjects' view of the candidate to ten-
tative decision and unfavorable treatment groups. When the
data for manipulated hindsight were analyzed, the former
effect was restricted to favorable treatments, while the lat-
ter effect was not restricted. Lastly, the internal analysis
yielded effects of hindsight on the importance of the letter
measure for subjects in final decision treatment groups. No
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effect of hindsight on this measure had occurred previously.
For subject in low hindsight conditions the internal
analysis yielded differential effects of finality of decision
on the importance of the letter and on the measure dealing
with the letter's influence in changing subjects' view of
the candidate. Neither effect occurred previously. There
were also differential effects of finality of decision on
the degree of bias of the information in the "late" letter
and on the writer of that letter. The effects on the former
measure occurred for subjects in high hindsight-unfavorable
conditions and in low hindsight-unfavorable conditions.
Neither effect occurred previously. The effects on the lat-
ter measure occurred only for subjects in low hindsight-
unfavorable conditions. Previously this effect was not re-
stricted to unfavorable treatment groups.
The subject's impression of her initial decision .
Subjects in high hindsight conditions reported greater re-
sponsibility for their decision than subjects in low hind-
sight conditions (high hindsight, X = 6.67; low hindsight,
X = *K94; F = 10.06, df 1/83, £<.002). And, subjects in
unfavorable treatment groups reported less confidence in
their decision than subjects in favorable treatment groups
(unfavorable, X = 5.16; favorable, X 6.21; F - 5.29, df «
1/83, £<.02).
In summary, the internal analysis demonstrated that
hindsight had general effects on the responsibility measure.
l6l.
When the data for manipulated hindsight were analyzed, this
effect was restricted to the favorable treatment groups. Also
favorability of the event had no differential effect, where,
as previously it did have for subjects in high hindsight
conditions.
On the confidence measure the internal analysis yielded
only a main effect of favorability of the event. For the
analysis of manipulated hindsight this finding was not general
Internal Analysis: Change of decision
Analyses of the numbers of subjects changing their deci-
sion revealed nothing which was not made apparent by the
analysis of manipulated hindsight.
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CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
As anticipated, subjects' evaluations of their chosen
and nonchosen alternatives were strongly affected by the
favorability of the fait accompli event. Although our hy-
pothesis predicted effects for all but the final decision-
hindsight treatment (no prediction was offered about that
condition), the effects of favorability were general across
combinations of finality of decision and hindsight treatment
groups. Specifically, subjects in favorable treatment groups
evaluated the chosen candidate more favorably than subjects
in the unfavorable treatment groups; while subjects in un-
favorable treatment groups evaluated the nonchosen candidate
more favorably than subjects in the favorable treatment groups.
In addition, it was found that subjects reacted differently
to the information in the "late" letter depending upon
whether that information was favorable or unfavorable. That
is, subjects in unfavorable treatments evaluated the letter
as more biased and less important, and the writer of the let-
ter as more biased, than did subjects in favorable treatment
groups. And whether or not the subject changed her decision
was also a function of the favorability of the event: subjects
changed more with an unfavorable event than with a favorable
event.
The hindsight variable did not have many of the antic-
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ipated effects. To be sure, there was evidence that subjects
in final decision.no hindsight-unfavorable treatment groups
suffered regret. And there was also evidence that subjects
in final decision-no hindsight-favorable treatment groups
experienced a high level of dissonance reduction. But the
assumption of this study was that the impact of a fait ac-
comP11 even* would be jointly mediated by the finality of
decision and hindsight. A decision which is thought to be
final at the time it is made should be difficult to change,
and especially so if one has hindsight (believes he should
have known all the relevant facts at the time he made his
decision). The general trend of the data provides little
support for this reasoning. However, subjects in hindsight
treatment groups did report that the fait accompli information
changed their view of the candidate less than subjects in no
hindsight treatment groups. Although this finding provides
some support for the basic postulate, there is little evi-
dence that finality of decision had the expected effects.
The manner in which hindsight was manipulated may ac-
count for some of our negative findings. Although the man-
ipulation produced a higher level of acknowledged hindsight
in the high hindsight treatment groups than in the low hind-
sight groups, it did not generate a very high level of ac-
knowledged hindsight among subjects who received the unfavor-
able fait accompli event. The manipulation of hindsight ap-
pears to have been confounded with the manipulation of favor-
ability, and subjects receiving the unfavorable fait accompli
event may have experienced very little dissonance. (Learning
that one has made a "bad" decision should have little effect
on the self-image if one feels that he cannot really be held
responsible for the decision, anyhow.) If a low level of
hindsight muted the dissonance aroused by the discovery that
one's decision was wrong, little defensiveness should have
been manifested.
Because of this confounding of hindsight with favorability
,
an internal analysis was undertaken. Subjects were classified
according to the hindsight manipulation they had received.
Although this procedure did not totally eliminate the con-
founding, it reduced it to a minimum. Subjects in the high-
acknowledged hindsight conditions reported greater responsi-
bility for their decision than subjects in low hindsight con-
ditions. And subjects in high hindsight conditions reported
that the information in the "late" letter was less "new"
than did subjects in low hindsight conditions. In the anal-
ysis of manipulated hindsight these differences occurred only
when the fait accompli event was favorable. Since the hypoth-
eses of this study were predicated on the assumption that
subjects with high hindsight would consider the information
to be less "new" , and would feel greater responsibility for
their decision, it was crucial that these links be less con-
founded, as they were in the internal analysis.
Hindsight had its most immediate impact in tentative
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decision treatment groups, m general, these findings in-
dicated that high hindsight tended to accentuate the ef-
fectiveness of a favorable message but to suppress the ef-
fectiveness of an unfavorable message. Specifically when
the fait accompli event was favorable, subjects in high hind-
sight conditions were much more prone than subjects in low
hindsight conditions to rate the chosen candidate more favor-
ably than the unchosen candidate. But when the message con-
tradicted the subjects' decision, subjects in high hindsight
conditions tended to rate the two candidates about equally
favorable, while subjects in low hindsight conditions rated
the previously chosen candidate much less favorably than the
unchosen candidate. Since there was no control group for
tentative decision treatment groups it was not possible to
assess which group changed the most. However, subjects re-
ported that they changed less with high hindsight than with
low hindsight.
These findings are not completely consistent with dis-
sonance theory. A dissonance analysis can handle the effects
of unfavorable events but not the effects of favorable events.
(If the theory accounted for the effects of favorable events,
low hindsight should show greater effectiveness of the message
since the information it contains is "new".) An unfavorable
message that contains admittedly new information (low hind-
sight) may have a large effect because the information is
new . But the same unfavorable message may have little ef-
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feet if the recipient feels that he should and did know the
information at the time he made his decision. Or, high hind-
sight may have made subjects relatively more defensive than
low hindsight. When a message is favorable and received with
hindsight it says one has been right for the right reasons;
it supports the wisdom of the decision-maker and perhaps al-
lows him to be even more extreme in his seemingly correct
judgment. But when a message is favorable without hindsight,
it says one has been right for the wrong reasons, it presumably
belittles the decision-maker and may therefore make him feel
cautious or negative about affirming his initial judgment
and about conforming to the opinion expressed in the "late"
letter.
A possible unification of these results is provided by
theories of achievement motivation and fear of failure (e.g.,
McClelland, 1961; Birney, Burdick, and Teevan, 1969). Such
an approach is appropriate, in part, only when a person is
responsible for the outcome of his performance. In other
words, an individual experiences success or failure to the
extent that he is responsible for an outcome. Since high
hindsight induces responsiblity, subjects receiving the
unfavorable event with high hindsight should feel more
failure than subjects receiving the unfavorable event with
low hindsight. Subjects receiving the favorable event with
high hindsight should feel more success than subjects receiv-
ing the favorable event with low hindsight. Since failure
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threatens a person's self-concept, subjects who received the
unfavorable event with hindsight should have experienced more
dissonance than those who received it without hindsight. The
former should have been more defensive and should have tried
harder to protect their self-image, than would people with
low hindsight. Moreover, since individuals who received a
favorable message with high hindsight should have experienced
more success than people receiving the same message with low
hindsight, a reinforcement-type theory would argue for less
effect of the favorable message with low hindsight.
Hindsight also had a delayed impact of final decision
treatment groups. Evaluations of the candidates showed only
regret (unfavorable conditions) or dissonance reduction (favor-
able conditions) for both hindsight treatments. However,
there is some evidence to suggest that responsibility was not
salient at first and that over time, it determined responses
by inducing subjects to .justify their ratings of the alter-
natives. That is, the information contained in the "late"
letter was reported to be more important by subjects in high
hindsight conditions than low hindsight conditions. Given
high hindsight, subjects in unfavorable treatment groups
reported the information and the writer of the information
to be less biased. With high hindsight, subjects in favorable
treatment groups (for both decision conditions) reported that
the information changed their view of the candidate less.
Each of these items appeared on the second questionnaire.
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These findings are consistent with dissonance theory,
but perhaps in a less than straightforward way. Many dis-
sonance theorists (see Festinger, i 964) would argue that
after an individual has made a final decision he has regrets.
.
To the extent that the "late" information enhanced the regret
(unfavorable event) or minimized the regret (favorable event),
the responsibility induced by the high hindsight manipulate*!
may not have influenced responses because it was overshadowed
by the prevailing mood (regret or euphoria). Or, subjects
may have relied on emotion, not reason, when assessing the
candidates.
The principal impact of the finality of decision man-
ipulation was on subjects in low hindsight conditions. In
general, these effects tended to demonstrate that, with a
final decision, subjects were more committed to their deci-
sions, and hence manifested greater dissonance reduction
than subjects making tentative decisions. Specifically, the
final decision treatment produced more positive difference
scores, more favorable ratings of the chosen candidate, and
less favorable ratings of the nonchosen candidate (a finding
which was also obtained for high hindsight conditions). In
addition, the information in the letter was judged less im-
portant, and had less effect on high hindsight subjects' views
of the candidates. These effects were not restricted by
favorability treatments; however, there were some additional
dissonance-reducing responses which were limited to unfavorable
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conditions: when the message was unfavorable, subjects in
final decision treatment groups rejected the information and
the writer more than subjects in tentative decision treatment
groups
.
These findings can be interpreted as reflecting the
emotional vs. "rational" quality of subjects' responses. To
the extent that subjects in final decision-high hindsight
conditions responded on the basis of emotion or mood rather
than reason, finality was not a determinant of response.
Therefore final and tentative decision treatment groups did
not differ when hindsight was high. On the other hand, when
hindsight was low subjects presumably responded on the basis
of reason, rather than emotion. ("Sure, I made a mistake,
but it was not my fault.") To the extent that this was the
case, finality should have been salient, as it was.
In summary, the results for the hindsight comparisons
and the finality of decision comparisons suggested that dis-
sonance-reducing responses occurred with high hindsight treat-
ments and final decision treatments, unless the two were
combined. When the two were both present, subjects 1 responses
appear to have been determined by emotion. Perhaps Aronson's
(1969) statement that "dissonance theory does not rest upon
the assumption that man is a rational animal; rather it sug-
gests that man is a rationalizing animal..." can be amended.
Man is a rationalizing animal only when he is rational.
There was one possible source of confounding in this
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study, Favorability was completely confounded with the order
in which the chosen and nonchosen candidates were evaluated.
Subjects in unfavorable treatment groups always rated the
chosen candidate before they rated the nonchosen candidate.
Subjects in favorable treatment groups, on the other hand,
always rated the nonchosen candidate before they rated the
chosen candidate. To check on this possible confounding,
the control group was analyzed by comparing the responses of
subjects who evaluated the chosen candidate first with those
who evaluated their nonchosen candidate first. The analysis
revealed only two differences out of fifteen comparisons. It
is not likely, then, that order of response can account for
the favorability findings since order has effects on only two
of the measures, and the significance levels were considerably
lower than those found for experimental subjects.
Subjects* responses to the questions dealing with the
specific credentials in each candidate's folder suggest that
subjects in low hindsight conditions generally did not rely
very heavily on the credentials in the folders. Perhaps this
reflects the fact that the low hindsight manipulation stres-
sed the incompleteness and unreliability of the information
in the folders. Subjects in final decision conditions re-
ported that the standardized tests of the chosen and nonchosen
candidates were less important than did subjects in tentative
decision conditions. This suggests that commitment may have
induced subjects to assess the points made in the letter to
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the exclusion of anything else. Since standardized tests
were not mentioned in the letter, they tended not to be
taken into account.
No attempt has been, or will be, made to interpret the
few significant effects which occurred when the identity of
the chosen candidate was included in the analyses. These
effects may reflect differences between the interests and
personalities of the two candidates. One of the candidates
was more business-oriented, and the other was more education-
oriented. Subjects choosing one over the other may have
selected them on that basis.
This study has some interesting implications for the
fait accompli issue in particular, and dissonance theory in
general. An individual' s . feeling of responsibility for a
decision, and hence his defensive reaction to unfavorable
outcomes, can be manipulated postdecisionally. Furthermore,
our results occurred primarily in tentative decision con-
ditions, whereas they were anticipated in final decision
conditions. A review of the studies cited in the introduction
as support for our hypothesis suggests that either the initial
decision may not have been very commiting (e.g., freedom
clause), or if the initial decision was commiting, the unfavor-
able event was not very damaging to the self-concept (e.g.,
the subject does not get a ticket to a movie). Clearly the
final decision treatment in this study was commiting and the
unfavorable event was damaging to the self-image. It is
172.
probable that dissonance processes can not function in such
situations, and that emotionalism determines response. Thus
our tentative decision-unfavorable event condition more
closely paralleled research in which the effect of fait ac-
compli events have been manifested. Apparently, then, dis-
sonance processes tend to operate best when both commitment
and responsibility are not at high levels.
Dissonance theory can not handle the results for favor-
able events very well. The point of view argued by this study
was that the initial decision was dissonance arousing (see
Pestinger, 1957). Favorable events should reduce dissonance
to the extent that they are believed to convey "new" infor-
mation. Therefore, it should be the case that dissonance
would be reduced to a greater extent when the favorable
event is received with low hindsight than when it is received
with high hindsight. The opposite, in fact, occurred. Per-
haps the "new" information mediator operates when responsibil-
ity for success is not salient. Nonetheless, the study under-
scores the necessity of considering the effects of responsi-
bility on favorable and unfavorable events from a theoretical
perspective other than dissonance theory. An achievement
motivation or fear of failure analysis may provide the neces-
sary framework.
Much of the recent dissonance research has attempted to
identify the conditions under which cognitive dissonance
theory is predictive. Such was the attempt here. However,
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this study's failures point to situations where dissonance
processes do not determine response: l) when subjects receive
confirmation of their decision, and 2) when subjects are
responding emotionally because of too much responsibility
and commitment.
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FOOTNOTES
1. This investigation was supported by Grant MH 20169
from Public Health, Ivan D. Steiner, principal investi-
gator
.
2. This interaction was only marginally significant
(£<.06) when the four-way analysis was performed.
3. This main effect was only marginally significant (o <.06)
when the identity of the chosen candidate was added as
a second factor in the analysis.
APPENDIX 1
Candidates' Credentials
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Graduate Record Examinations (GRE)
Description of the Test :
A student applying to graduate school takes both an aptitude test and an advanced
ah i" °5
sPecial»«ion. The aptitude t est measures general slhoLsUc
atBig
t
i£\K£"!' J"' 1 rd /ieldS for verbal and ouan? aUve1 £ -5Vff rX V* aptlT"dP tPSf aCa5UrCS ths candidate's knowledgeot words and their elationships to one another and his ability to comprehend readingmaterials from a variety of sources. The quantitative section of the Ktitude test
EST- "nderstandin e of mathematical synbols and tests his .biliff to use thesesymbols in solving Problems. Lccause the abilities Measured by the two sections ofthe aptitude test are quite different, two scores are reported: one for the verbal
11 SfarL*!!
tCSt
^ f°r *»Srt"iw section' 'any students are stronger
ndicaMon J in r5C °f^ T° SCp3rate SCOrGS '^ * ive * *»• accuratei cati of a condidate's abilities than a single, combined score would give.
The advanced test is designed to measure mastery and comprehension of materials
111* I
eraauate study m a student's major area. Thus a student intending to go tograduate scnoo in psychology would take the advanced test in psychology. The advancedtest in psychology emphasizes the basic concepts and principles of psychology andincludes questions that require reasoning, analysis, and decisions based on one'sknowledge of these principles. ?>0 student, however, is expected to be familiar withthe tests entire range of subject matter since the items are from widely different
areas witnin psychology. Thus, a student taking the advanced test in psychology
would have questions from such diverse areas as social, physiological, clinical
statistics, and experimental psychology. Only one score is reported for this test.
Interpretation of the Test Scores :
The score for each section of the GREs can be as low as 200 and as high as 800
Each college or university interprets the scores on the verbal and quantitative parts
of the aptitude test as well as the score on the advanced test by' its own criteria.
In the past the average verbal GRE score was 586.5 for graduate students accepted
into the University of Massachusetts psychology program. The average .quantitative" GRE
score was 618.1 for graduate students accepted into the University of iassachusetts
psychology program. And, the average score on the advanced test in psychology was
603.7. Of course each of these average scores indicate that a number of graduate
students accepted into the program received higher or lower scores.
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Miller Analogies Test (K\T)
Descript ion of the Tw -
to
— >«y parties sulject o.,,^^^«~o«Examples of the Items :
1) LIGf:T is to DARK as PrF^n-jp i - » ,LEASURE as to (a. pxenic, b. day, c. pain. d. night)
answer is c
2) BRONZE is to COPPER as PE TE" is to r=tit. (a. iron, b. steel, c
. tin, d. brass)
answer is c
Interpretati on of Test Scores :
only £X^t^*^™ * « of 100. In other words
own criteria, m the past the wS^lJT.SrTfS'ItS the -ore by tsthe University of Massachusetts Dsvc'nino graduate students accepted into
score indicates that a nun f
P S Was 7a
-J-
« course, the average
wlule others recieved scores lower ?han ^4 rCCeiVCd SC°res better tl™ 78.4.
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
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F""" Date
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Subject uj^....&MA.u^x^.r.Vfesr..
Statement of Purpose
The statement you are dbout to read was written by Jeffrey Stevenson
in answer to the following question which was asked on the graduate school
application: "Briefly discuss your long range research and teaching interests."
I would like to combine my background in management and psychology.
Psychology, particularly social psychology, could and should play a more active
and vital role in the training of persons in managerial positions.
Furthermore, I would like to do research bridging these two disciplines.
For example, it would be worthwhile to determine under what situations certain
types of managers are most effective. Also, I want to teach both management
and psychology. I think it is vital to bridge the two areas in this way as well.
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Transcript
Name: Jeffrey Stevenson
Course No.
Freshman Year--Fall Semester
English
Geology
History
Mathematics
Psychology
100
100
103
10S
100
Freshman Year--Spring Semester
English 103
Geology 101
History 104
Mathematics 106
Philosophy 100
Sophomore Year--Fall Semester
Management
Markcti ng
Mathematics
Psychology
Sociology
Spanish
100
100
210
140
100
120
Sophomore" Year--Spring Semester
History
Management
Psychology
Psychology
Spanish
111
101
241
283
121
Junior Year--Fall Semester
History
Management
Psychology
Psychology
Psychology
123
225
ISO
290
295
Junior Ycar--Spring Semester
History
Management
Phi losophy
Philosophy
Psychology
Psychology
124
222
201
211
237
151
Title
Composition
Introductory I
Early European
Calculus I
Introductory
World Literature
Introductory II
Contemporary European
Calculus II
Introductory
Principles of Management
Fundamentals of Marketing
Advanced Calculus
Statistics
Introductory
Intermediate I
Asian History
Administration Theory
Advanced Statistics
Animal Learning
Intermediate II
American to 18S0
Personnel Management
Lab. in Animal Learning
Social Psychology
History (, Systems
American since 1850
Buyer Behavior
Logic
Philosophy of Science
Abnormal
Lab. in Social Psychology
Grade
B
A-
B+
B-
B+
B-
B+
A
B-
B-
A-
B+
C+
B-
C+
A-
B+
A-
C+
A
B+
A
B+
C+
A-
B+
B-
A-
B-
c*
B +
B-
Senior Ycar--Fall Semester
Computer Science 100
Management 263
Psychology 300
Psychology 350
Sociology 245
Senior Year--Spring Semester
Computer Science 101
Management 266
Management 301
Psychology 301
Psychology 351
Basic
Labor Unions
Seminar in Human Learning
Independent Research
Juvenile Delinquency
(Tentative Courses)
Fort ran
Business Policy 6 Strategy
Sem. in Personnel Management
Sem. in Social Psychology
Independent Research
GfOCiUOlJO School (Tills form requires no «arbon paper.)
Univorsity of Massachusetts • Amherst, Massachusetts 01002
REFERRAL FORM Date _
Name of Applicant J^SESLSSSSSSS, _ _ _ Degree desired
,
Ph ' P
:
Address ..... „
_
_
_
_ _
Major Field of Graduate Study Psychology.
_ Sub field Social „
The applicant should fill out the above and give all copies of the fonn to the individual who will complete the referral.
The information given in this recommendation will be considered confidential. We are particularly interested in the applicant's
ability to carry on advanced study arid research, his general character, his stability, and his capacity to pursue a successful career in
his field. I'lease write your opinion of the applicant and mail the first two copies to the Graduate School Admissions C:Ticc, University
of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mcssachu.-*lts 01002. The third copy is for your filt-3. Wc appreciate your as^i-tance,
I have been asked by Jeffrey Stevenson to write this letter of recom;;iendati on for
his admittance into graductc school. I had Jeffrey in one of my classes two years ago
and am now his instructor in a second as well as his advisor on his independent research
project. He was one of the few students to ger an A in the learning course (Psychology
2GB) . I was pleased by his performance on written examinations and his ability to
question concepts he did not understand. So far this semester my interaction with hip
has been just as rewarding. However, I have been disappointed with his performance in
psychology courses other than mine.
His independent research project is interesting. Although I do not think it is as
profound as it could be, it is a worthwhile study and should generate some rather
fascinating results about verbal learning. He tells me that he ultimately wants to use
his psychological training in a business or managerial setting. It seems like a logical
extension of his present interests. I must add, however, that I not completely
certain that psychology graduate school is the place to pursue this endeavor. Still
I am sure he would pcrfora adequately if accepted.
Pltait role the applicant in comparison with othert of his age and position whom you have huium:
I should rank this student in tho top .. 20 ...Ve of approximately .2100 students I have taught in 4 years.
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GrCZOUCta fCriOoS (Tin. form requires no carbon paper.)
Unlvorsity of MaGPacr-iusGfts * Amherst, /Y.asscichuso.fs 01002
REFERRAL FORM
Date
_
_
Item, of Applet
..Jeffrey
.Stevenson -
_„.__ Degree desired .PH.D.
Address
_
M.jor Field of Graduate Study ?*X$£}MX Sub-f.tld .Social
The applicant should fill out the above and c ,ve .11 copies of the form lothe individual who will complete the referral.
hi. f i t Ul. • • • " •«•. nia iiJi'ini), ami nis capacity to pur-
rfafZLLhZ!!
wrue your opimon of the apphcant and mail the first two copies ,„ ,he Cr.du.ite School Adr.of Uauachuiett*, Amherst. Kassachutttli 01002. The third copy ii for yoa , files. We appreciate your assist,
ic G a ua .its-.ions Ol.iec, University
! istance
Jeffrey's minor area of study is management
, I have taught two of the courses he
has taken in m magemcnt and am his instructor in a third he is taking this semester. Mis
work is generally fine, although once in awhile of mediocre caliber. Occasionally he
gets flustered when he docs not understand a concept. However, he frequently lias
interesting points to bring up in class. These arc presented clearly and often show
unusual insight.
His papers and examination have shown an ability to transmit thoughts well. I
seldom have trouble understanding his written work. Yet, he could learn to be more
thorough in answering questions. Sometimes his answers lack sophistication, but he
always does an adequate job in handling them. *
1 think Jeffrey has a promising future. It has taken him awhile to decide on a
major area of study. Since he has decided, he has worked hard to relate his psychology
courses to his management courses.
/"lease rote tht applicant in cennpariton with othirt cf hit cat and potitin whom you have known:
I should rank this stuJent in the top of approximately
.55.9.P...... students I have teur;ht in .
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Graduate Record Examinations (GRE)
Description of the Test :
test ii^fsjs^iifsss' sz°i it, both an aptitude test -d -
ability at the Graduate lev^.nH- T5 apti ude test measures general scholastic
ability. iS vE?al section or t^anr^^ «COres f°r Verbal and quantitative
° f ™*> ^^-^lo^^ pledge
materials from a variety of sources t,T I ablllt y to coriprehend reading
measures his ,,,,,1,
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,
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symbols in solving oroble^s ' " *JS?*?
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, S'dirSt twn 5 ^ ^ ^ tW° SGCti0nS ° f
section of th* tL* ! 3
"tterent, o scores are reported: one for the verbal
a a a th T <lUantltative ••"Ion. 'any students are Sponger
£^t^o^eJIu£tS?S-?;- S,P^mt* SCOrCS ' therefore . 8™ a .ore accurateaication of a condidate s abilities than a single, combined score would give.
basic^o ^Tult ^ dCSignf t0 neaSUXe naStery and "uprehension of materials
BSS5^^rir,sf sttai fmbr*
tte tests' entir?r^:
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?
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K- °
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'
hol"'eVcr
'
is exPected t0 b< Miliar with
ULl .J!- . tirj an« e of subject natter since the itens are from widely different
t
"
ltnin Penology. Thus, a student taking the advanced test in p ychoJo^would have questions from such diverse areas as social^ physiological /el nxcastatistics, and experimental psychology. Only one score is reported for this test.
Interpretation of the Test Scores :
Each Ton^n
for
.
each
,
soction of ^e GREs can be as low as 200 and as high as 800.
S th! \ J A diversity interprets the scores on the verbal and quantitative Dartsof e aptitude test as well as the score on the advanced test by' its own criteria
into JL
t
flL
PaSt
-!
he
c
Verag2 VCThAl GR
-
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-
SCOre was 586
• 5 for graduate students accepted
«£™ wL w 7 °X jassa"usetts Psychology program. The average quantitative*
G
REscore as 618.1 for graduate students accepted into the University of Massachusett spsychology program. And, the average score on the advanced test in psychology was603 7. Of course eaca of these average scores indicate that a number of graduate
students accepted into the program received higher or lower scores.
From
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
MEMORANDUM
Date
Subject
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Hiller Analogies Test tf.tf.T)
Description of the Test :
solution'^l^^lr^^^* 1 rntf 3billty tCSt^ ^ires thetest consists of 100 anal!!gie ^ ng ° n^ * ^^^5°™ ° f bogies. Theinclude a broad sampling across a nth r !f L difficulty. Since the itens
Exanples of the Items :
1) LIGHT is to DARK as PLEASURE is to (a. picnic, b. day. c. pain. d. night)
answer is c
2) 3R0NZE is to COPPE, as PE i/IR is to (a. iron. b. steel, c. tin. d. brass)
answer is c
Interpretation of Test Scores :
The student's score is the nunber correct he aets out of 100 r,cnly raw scores are reported Each ™iir™ «~ ' In other w°rds,
own criteria. In the past the
diversity interprets the score by its
the University of ^sSsettY yXogJ IToZ^tT S*™ int0score indicates that a nunber of eradaatf«?Snf ^' f °°Urse ' the average
while others recieved scores lower than 78 !J
S SC°reS better than 78
:
4
'
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UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
MEMORANDUM
From Date
To
Sus bject.
r
Statement of Purpose
answer
The statement you are about to read was written by Michael Behrend in
;r lth%f0l i0wlng 1ucsti °n "hich was asked on the graduate school appli-m. BrietlV diSCUSS VOUr lonp rancrr> re.c^,r-rh „ u; :.r
.... „.« ^ 11 „„ il ,6 n^^Liu,, wn n
cation: f y scuss you g nge research and teaching interests
I want to study more about the learning process, especially in children
It is perhaps well to investigate how a child learns from his parents peers
and the mass media in both the laboratory and the field. This area isparticularly relevant to the problems we face in the world today. Childrenfor example, arc learning more and more a lot earlier than we did and it
'
would be interesting to know if this early learning has any effect on a child'spersonality or emotional behavior.
My research would be actively combined with teaching for two reasons-
(1) Often experimental ideas get formulated in a better way when experimenters
teach; (2) Students often offer valuable insights into or different views of
psychological phenomena.
Transcript
Name: Michael Behrend
Course No. Title Grade
Freshman Year--Fall Semester
Biology
English
Government
Mathematics
Speech
Freshman Year--Spring Semester
Biology
English
Mathematics
Music
Speech
Sophomore Year--Fall Semester
Economics
Educat ion
Government
History
Psychftlogy
1
1
15
3
1
Sophomore Year--Spring Semester
History
Mathematics
Psychology
Psychology
Psychology
Puhlic Health
12
54
12
36
42
11
Junior Year--Fall Semester
Economics
Educat ion
Education
Psychology
Psychology
Speech
15
11
13
41
65
25
Junior Year--Spring Semester
Economics
Education
Psychology
Psychology
Psychology
16
58
46
54
66
Botany
American Literature
American Political Systems
Analytic Geometry (, Calculus
Introduction to Theatre
Zoology
British Literature
Calculus II
Music Appreciation
Intro, to Mass Communications
Introductory
Elementary
Ancient Political Thought
Ancient History
Introductory
English History
Probability Theory
Statistics
Animal Learning
Child Psychology
Community Health
Theory of Prices
Occupational Education
International Education
Advanced Statistics
Lab. in Animal Learning
Children's Drama
Money 6 Banking
History of Education
Abnormal
History 6 Systems
Lab. in Child Psychology
B+
A-
A-
C+
A-
B+
A-
B-
A
A-
B-
A-
B*
B+
B+
B
C
B-
B+
A
B*
C
A-
A
C*
c+
B+
C*
B
B-
A
C
205.
Course No.
Senior Year--Fall Semester
Educat ion
Phi losophy
Psychology
Psychology
Sociology
81
11
91
97
1
Title
Theories of Education
Logic
Sem. in Abnormal Psychology
Independent Research
Introductory
Grade
Senior Year--Spring Semester (Tentative Courses)
Educat ion
Education
Psychology
Psychology
Sociology
42
92
S4
98
22
Educational Psychology
Sem. in Philosophy of Education
Social Psychology
Independent Research
Drugs 6 Society
206
Gradticsfo School tmm "i"'"* no w*r-i
University of Massachusetts • Amherst, Mcir.sachuseifs 0. 002
REFERRAL FORM Date - _
.
, „
Michael Behrend Ph.D.
Name of Applicant _ _ Degree desired
Address - - - _ „
_
Major Field of Graduate EtuJy . ..Psychology. ;._ _ Sub-field .Child _
The applicant should fill out the above and give all copies of the form to the individual who will complete the referral.
The information given in this recommendation will be considered confidential. Wc are particularly interested in the applicant's
ability to carry on advanced study and research, his general character, his stability, and his capacity to puisue a successful career in
his field, l'lease write your opinion of the applicant and mail the first two copies to the Graduate School Admissions Oftice, University
of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01002. The third copy is for your f.lcs. Wc appieciate your assistance.
I find it somewhat difficult to predict how Michael will do in graduate school. His
course work in psychology is, on the whole, average. Mule this qualifies him for doing
graduate work, I must admit uneasiness at the prospect. He appears motivated in class
but docs not out of class, lie has seldom been around the department until this semester;
therefore, he has not played an active role in undergraduate departmental affairs. He
is a member of Psi Chi, the honorary psychological society, and has contributed little
effort to the organization.
He has been in three of my classes and performed fairly well. Ho asks relevant
question; indicating that he has read thoughtfully. His examination; however, do not
always reflect the same degree of ability.
The interest he has shown in relating education and psychology is mature realization
of a definite overlap in the disciplines and a need for more interrelated work. I
would be more certain of his success in graduate school if I knew how sincere his
interests in psychology are.
PUate rate the applicant in comparison with othcrt 0/ /lis aye onrf posifion whom you have kntnm:
I should rank this student in the top ....?.§....5S of approximately .5000 students I have taught in 19......
years.
Upucr lerl%
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bui r.u upr*r
lorl*
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Date
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Graduate Scltoo!
University of Massachusetts * Amherst, Massachusetts 01GC2
REFErtRM. FORM Date
(This form requires no carbon paper.)
Michael Behrcnd
Name of Applicant Degree desired
Ph.D.
Address „ „
_
_ _
Major fUU of Graduate Study ?*Y#?}?M. Sub-field
_
_..
The applicant should fill out the above and give all copies of the form to the individual who will complete the referral.
The Information given in this recommendation will b? considered confidential. We are particularly interested in the applicant's
ability to carry on advanced study anil research, his general chpract^r, his stability, and his capacity to pursue a successful career in
hia field. Please wnlc your opinion of the applicant and mail the firs*. t»o copies to the Graduate School Admissions Office, University
of Massachusetts, Amherst, Masiarhl. setta 010U2. The third copy is for your 6!cs. We opprcciaU your assistance.
Michael's courses in education qualify him as excellent teaching materiel. We
In the education program, have come to know Mike well and think highly of his ability.
I have had him in two of my classes, lie seems to understand the problems in education
»nd responds to them. He would be a good person to have in the fanks of academia.
He works hard and makes up for any lack he may have in native intellectual ability as
his graduate record exam and Miller analogy test scores sec:n to indicate.
I think his education courses have been relevant to his work in psychology and
vice versa. It is not easy for me to predict how he would do in a graduate program,
but I would say he is graduate school naterial--at least in terms of his experiences
in the school of education.
lie thinks things through thoroughly and, hence, does not appear to be a sloppy
thinker when he speaks. His writing,, on the other hand, can be careless and not
•lways understandable. 1 think this problem reflects a lack of experience in writing,
and I am sure that given more necessity to 'communicate in a written format, he will
do just fine. .
Pliate rate the applicant in comparison with ttheri of hit eye and position whem you have hnawn:
1 ahould rank this student in tho lop .71 of approximately .?..??9 students I have taught in ?. years.
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"Late" Letters of Recommendation
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GrGCjUOtO Schod (This form requires no carbon paper.)
University of Wassachuse^s * Amherst, Massachusetts 010C2
REFERRAL T-ORM Date _
Jeffrey Stevenson
Name of Applicant
Address
Major Field of Graduate Study „.?5!£&?i?S£
Degree desired
Ph.D.
Social
Sub- field
The applicant should fill out the above and give all copies of the form to the individual w ho will complete the referral.
The information given in this recommendation drill be considered confidential. We are particularly interested in the applicant's
ability to r irry on advanred study and rc'iarch, his frenera! character, his stability, and his capacity to pursue a successful raiver in
his field. Please write your opinion of the an.licant and mail the fir-t two copies to the Graduate School Admissions Ofhce, University
of Massachusetts, Ainl.erst, Massachusetts C1002. The thud copy is far your Rips. We appicciatfl your assistance.
Jeffrey Stevenson has been a student in two of r.y psychology classes. It should be obvious"
to anyone looking at Jeffrey's transcript that his grades show a definite patterning. His highest
psychology grades arc in a history anJ systems of psychology course, animal learning, and social
psychology. As you know these particular courses are largely memory-oriented and involve little
originality of thought. On the other hand, his lowest grades occurred in statistics and laboratory
courses dealing with animal learning and social psychology. liach of these involve creativity
and logical thinking. His psychology grades, then, indicate proficiency in course work stressing
only memory. It seems unnecessary to point this out to you as it is so easily seen.
This difference is similarly paralleled in his course work outside of psychology, and should
also be obvious to anyone looking at Jeffrey's transcript. For example, he has very high grades
in Spanish and management courses, again showing his adeptness at memory-oriented course work.
When it comes to his work in philosophy and mathematics
,
however, Jeffrey once again shows that
he is really unable to think logically and grasp concepts.
Although memory serves a useful function for a graduate student, creativity has been shown
to be the best predictor of success in graduate school. Since it is obvious that Jeffrey docs r
well in only memory-oriented courses, he docs not appear to be graduate school material.
Therefore, I do not reco.Tjnend him.
Please rate the applicant in comparison with others of his age and position whom you have known}
I should rank this student in the top of approximately j?.9~.?_.. students 1 have taught in ...JL years.
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Graduato School 'T,li" form "'i" 1"" no «art>on paper.)
University of Massachusetts • Amherst, Massachusetts 01002
REFERRAL FORM
Nam* of Applicant J^ESLSSSSBSSSL
Address __
Date
Degree desired Ph.D.
Psychology Social
M»jor Field of Graduate Study ..:....'....::'".??.
_ _ J_ Sub-field
The applicant should fill out the above and give all copies of the form to the individual who will complete the referral.
The information given in this recommendation will be considered confidential. We are particularly interested in the applicant's
ability to carry on advanced study and research, his general character, his stability, and his capacity to pursue a successful career in
his field. Please write your opinion of the applicant and mail the first two copies to the Graduate School Admissions Office, University
of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01002. The third copy is for your files. We appreciate your assistance.
Jeffrey Stevenson has been a student in two of ray psychology classes. It should not be
.
obvious to anyone not familiar with. this College, but the grades on Jeffrey's transcript show a
definite patterning. Mis highest grades are in a history and systems of psychology course, animal
learning, and social psychology. At this College, although not at most schools, these particular
courses are largely memory-oriented and involve little originality of thought. On the other hand,
his lowest grades occurred in statistics and his laboratory courses dealing with animal and social
psychology. Each of these involve creativity and logical thinking. His psychology grades, then,
indicate proficiency in course work stressing only memory. It seems necessary to point this out
to you as psychology courses do vary fnjm school to school.
This difference is similarly paralleled in his course work outside of psychology. 1 will
again point it out since schools do differ in what their courses stress. For example, he has
very high grades in Spanish and management courses, again showing his adeptness at memory-
oriented course work. When it comes to his work in philosophy and mathematics, however, Jeffrey
again shows that he is really unable to think logically and grasp concepts.
Although memory serves a. useful function for a graduate student, creativity has been shown
to be the best predictor' of success in graduate school. As I have tried to indicate to anyone /;
unfamiliar with this College, as you no doubt are, Jeffrey does well in only memory-oriented,
courses and thus is not graduate school material. Therefore, I do not recommend him.
Please rat* the applicant in comparison with others of his agt and petition whom you hav$ known: ;
I ahould rank this student in th» top ....4.0...% of approximately S000— students I have taught in ...9. years.
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Graduate School
University of Massachusetts • Amherst, Massachusetts 01002
(This form requires no carbon paper.)
REFERRAL FORM
Michael Behrend
Date
.
Dcgreo desiredName of Applicant
Major Field of Graduate Study Psychology: Sub-field .....Child.
The applicant should fill out the above and Rive all copies of the form to the individual who will complete the referral.
The information given in this recommendation will be considered confidential. We are particularly interested in the applicant'!
ability to carry on advanced study and rrsearch, his general chararter, his stability, and his capacity to pursue a successful career in
his field. Please write your opinion of the applicant and mail the first two copies to the Graduate School Admission! Office, University
of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01002. The third copy is for your files. We appreciate your assistance.
Michael Bchrcnd has been a student in two of my psychology classes. It should be obvious
to anyone looking at Michael's transcript that his grades show a definite patterning. His
highest psychology grades are in a history and systems of psychology course, animal psychology,
and child psychology. As you know these particular courses are largely memory-oriented and
involve little originality of thought. On the other hand, his lowest grades occurred in
statistics and laboratory courses dealing with animal and child psychology. Each of these involve
creativity and logical thinking. His psychology grades, then, indicate proficiency in course
work stressing only memory. It seems unnecessary to point this out to you as it is so easily seen.
This difference is similarly paralleled in his course work outside of psychology, and
should also be obvious to anyone looking at Michael's transcript. For example, he has very high
grades in speech and education courses, again showing his adeptness at mcmory-or 1 ented course
work. When it comes to his work in economics and mathematics, however, Michael once agam shows
that he is really unable to think logically and grasp concepts. • »
Although memory serves a useful function for a graduate student, creativity has been shown
to be the best prcdictor'of success in graduate school. Since it is obvious that Michael,
does ,<
well in only mcraory-oricntcd courses, he does not appear to be graduate school
material.
.
^
Therefore, I do not recommend him.
Please rote t»ie applicant in companion with others 0/ hit agt and pontion whom you hav€ known:
"
I should rank this student in the top ...40-% of approximately S000 . .. students I have taught in 3.
years.
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Graduato School
University of Massachusetts • Amherst, Massachusetts 01002
(This form requireII no carbon paper.)
REFERRAL FORM Date .
Name of Applicant
Address
Michael Bchrcnd Degree desired PluD..
Major Field of Graduate Study tS&SSB. - - - SuWMd GttU -
The applicant should fill out the above .nd (five all copies of the form to the individual who will
complete the referral.
The information given in this recommendation will be considered confidential. We are particularly interested in
the applicant.
.
ability to earn- on advanced study and research, his general character, his stability, and hi,
capacity to pursue a sucecssfu career m
his field PIMM write your opinion of the applicant and mail the first two copies to the Graduate School
Admissions Office, University
of Massachusetts. Amherst, Massachusetts 01002 The third copy it for your files.
We appreciate your assistance.
obvious
Michael Bchrcnd has been a student in two of my psychology classes. It should
not oe o
to anyone not familiar with this College, but the grades on Michael's
transcript show a
definite patterning. His highest psychology grades are in a history and
systems of P^0^
course animal psvchologv, and child psychology. At this College, although
not at most schools,
these particular courses' are largely memory-oriented and involve little
originality of fought.
On the other hand, his lowest grades occurred in statistics and
laboratory courses dealing with
ar.in.al and child psychology. Each of these involve creativity and logica
thinking. "M
psvchologv grades, then, indicate proficiency in course work stressing only
memory t seems
Secessary to point this out to you as psychology courses do vary
from school to school.
This difference is similarly paralleled in his course work outside of
psychology. I Mill
acain point it out since schools do differ in what their courses
stress. For example, he has
very hign grades in speech and education courses, again showing his
adeptness »t -mory-oriented
course work. When it comes to his work in economics and
mathematics, however, Michael again
shows that he is really upable to think logically and grasp
concepts.
,/
Although memory serves a useful function for a graduate
student, creativity has been shown
to be ne be t prcdlc or of success in graduate school.
As I have tried to indicate to anyone ,
toi r h
P
his College, as you no doubt are, Michael does well in
only memory-orien ed .
courses and thus is not graduate school material. Therefore,
I do not recommend him. ,
Picas, rate Me applicant in comparison witK other, of his aS c
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I .hou.d rank this student in the top .J
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APPENDIX 3
Dependent Measures
Questionnaire 1
Part 1: Rating scales on originality and graduate school potential
of the candidate evaluated by the late letter.
Please evaluate
.
,
JSi
1?^ Scales \ Answer each question as accurately as you can.The following series of questions concerns this candidate as a
the cSdidlcy <£
adUate school
«
Remember you are now evaluating
1) What degree of originality in his thinking does this candidatepossess?
degreloT
: : : : : : J^?
originality
originality
2) What degree of memorization ability does this candidate
'
possess
?
decree" of""
»0t a ve^ hi *ha grce i degree of
memorization ' • • • • • memorization
ability ability
3) '/hat degree of motivation toward his academic work does this'
candidate possess?
a very high not a hi hdegree of
: : : : : : : : : : degree of
motivation
. . motivation
4) What degree of creativity in his thinking does this candidate
possess?
a very high not a very hig'h
degree of
: : : : ; : : . : : degree of
creativity creativity
5) What degree of intelligence does this candidate possess?
a very high not a very high
degree of
: : : : : ; : : : : degree of
intelligence intelligence
6) What degree of potential "in teaching does this candidate possess?
a very high ' • nbt a very .high
degree of
: : : : : ; : : : : degree of
potential potential
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?)
poSessf
66
° f P0tential in Graduate school does this candidate
a very hip;h
degree of : s "
ot a ver7 hi ^h
? .. * • • • • • • • : : degree ofpotential potential
8) What degree of potential in research does this candidate possess?
deg^ S" £*! ^/ ^
potential ' ' potential
Part 2: Rating scales on originality and graduate school potential
of the candidate not evaluated by the late letter.
Please evaluate on thefollowing scales. Answer each question as accurately as you can.
The following series of questions concerns this candidate as a
candidate for graduate school. Remember you are now evaluating the
candidacy of
1) What degree of originality in his thinking does this candidate
possess?
a very high not a very hi hdegree of
: : : • • : ; : : : degree of
originality originality
2) What degree of memorization ability does this candidate possess?
a very high
.
. not a very high
degree of
. degree of
memorization " ' ' ' ' • • • . memorization
ability ability'
3) What degree of motivation toward his academic work does this
candidate possess?
a very high not a very high
degree of
: : : : : : : • ; : degree of
motivation motivation
What degree of creativity in his thinking does this candidate
possess?
a very high • not a very high
degree of
: : : : : _: j: : : : degree of
creativity • • creativity
, .
5) What degree of intelligence does this candidate possess?
a very high
degree of
intelligence
not a very high
degree of
intelligence
216.
6) What degree of potential in teaching does this candidate possess?
a very high „. . .
,
degree of : "ot a ve^ hl Sh
potential
' *
" ' * ' ' ' : ^gree °*
potential
7) What degree of potential in graduate school does this candidatepO S S G S S .
potential potential
8) What degree of potential in research does this candidate possess?
a very high not ver hi hdegree of
: : : : . s .
. . de 0/
potential potential
Part 3: Rating scales on the importance of the academic credentials
of candidates evaluated (Items la-le) and not evaluated (Items
2a-2e) by the late letter.
a) Student's transcript
i
a very high not a very highdegree of
: : : : : : : : : : degree of -
importance importance
b) Graduate Record Examination scores
a very high
. not a very high
degree of : : : : : : : : : : degree oT
importance importance
c) The two filed letters of recommendation
a very high not a very high
degree of
: : : : : : : : : : degree of
importance importance
d) Miller Analogies Test score
a very high
. not a very high
degree of
: : : : : : :_ : : degree of
importance '• importance
e) Student's statement of purpose
a very high not a very high
degree of
: : : : : : : : : : degree of
importance importance
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2) On the following scales please indicate what degree of importanceyou pave each piece of information aboutin making your ratings of him. 1
a) Student's transcript
fegrel : . . . -t a very high
Stance ———————
b) Graduate Record Examination scores
SeSSSf
gh not a very high
aegree oi
. .
.
.
: :
.
.
. . degree ofimportance importance
c) The two filed letters of recommendation
deSee of
g
* not a
' Very high
a gre i
. . .
: :
. : .
.
. degree ofimportance importance
d) Miller Analogies Test score
a very high not a very hi hdegree of
: : : : : :
_
:
.
.
. degree of
importance importance
fc) Student's statement of purpose
a very high not a very high
degree of
: : : : : : - • : : degree of
importance
. importance
Part Rating scales on the general importance of graduate
school admission . criteria.
3) How important do you think it is that graduate school acceptance
be based on criteria other than Graduate Record Examination scores?
very not very
important
: : : : : : : ; : : important
4) How important do you think it is that graduate school acceptance
be based on criteria other than Miller Analogies Test scores?
very
. . not very
important
: : : : : : : : : : important ' .
5) How important do you think it is that graduate school acceptance
be based on criteria other than letters of recommendation?
very not. very
important
: : : : : : : : : :
important
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6) How important do you think it is that graduate school acceptance
be based on criteria other than the student's statement of purpose?
very not very
importance : : : : : : : : : : important
7) How important do you think it is that graduate school acceptance
be based on criteria other than the student's transcript?
very not very
important
: : : : : : : : : : important
8) What other criteria do you think should be used as a basis for
accepting students into graduate school?
9) How important do you think it is that students wi th somewhat lower
academic ability be accepted into graduate school when they have the
interpersonal ability to relate and appreciate undergraduate student
problems?
very . not very -
important : : : : : : : : : : important
Part 5: Rating scales on affability and competitiveness of the
candidate evaluated by the late letter
Although it is often difficult to assess a candidate's
personality before meeting him, the information which we have on a
candidate often creates some kind of first impression about the
candidate's personality. We would like you to fill in each scale
below indicating your impression of
personality.
1) How- likeable is this candidate?
very not very
likeable : : : : : : : : : : likeable
2) How modest is this candidate?
very •'. not very
modest : : : : : : *• : modest-
3) How industrious is this candidate?
very not very
industrious : : : : : : : : : : industrious
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4) How friendly is this candidate?
yefy a-, n°t veryfriendly :
: ! : : : : : : : friendly
5) After a brief acquaintance, how much will people want to retto know the candidate better?
very not very
much
: :_! : : : : : much
6) How sincere a person is this candidate?
very not very
sincere
: : ;
•
; ; sincere
7) Some people are able to gain admiration and resoect from others
very easily and other people are not. How easily can this person
gain admiration from others?
very not very
easily
! ! : ! : ! : easily
8) How competitive is this candidate?
very not very
competitive
: : : : : : :
_: • competitive 1
Part 6: Rating scales on affability and competitiveness of the
candidate not evaluated by the late letter
Although it is 'often difficult to assess a candidate's
personality before meeting him, the information which .we have on
a candidate often creates some kind of first impression about the
candidate's personality. We would like you to fill in each scale
below indicating your impression of
_'s
personality.
1) How likeable is this candidate?
very not very
likeable : : : : : : : : : : likeable
2) How modest is this candidate?
very . not very
modest : : : : '. '. ' 'jl '• : modest
3) Hov; industrious is this candidate?
very not very
industrious : : : : : : : : : : industrious
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M How friendly is this candidate?
very
friendly
:
•
.
v
°£v
5) After a brief acquaintance, how much will people want tnget to know the candidate better?
P o
very
mucy
: :
_
:
.
verV
6) How sincere a person is this candidate?
much
very
sincere : : n?* verv
sincere
iL^t-^10, alt able t0 ^ain admiration and respect from othersvery easily and other people are not. How easily can this persoSgain admiration from other? n
very
easily :
_
: :
.
.
.
.
, . .
™*J®
ry
8) How competitive is this candidate?
competitive
: : : : . . ._.
.
. cSmpItltive
'
Questionnaire 2
, ?he late letter of recommendation discussed some reasons forthinking .
candidate" for graduate school. —
iS n0t
*
V6ry Str°ng
*
1) To what degree do you feel that you should have realized those
reasons even before you read the letter of recommendation?
—
S fi^ ly definitelyshould haye should no£
realized those.
. have rea lized
reasons even ' • • • • • • those reasons
Jl?rG re even before Ithe letter read the ietter
2) To what degree do you feel that you did realize the reasons
contained in the late letter of recommendation?
definitely did definitely did
realize those
: : : ; : . :
. not re ai ize
reasons reasons
3) To what degree do you feel that the information contained in the
late-arriving document was unbaised?
definitely definitely
unbiased
: : : : : : : : : : biased
*'»
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4) To what degree do you feel that the information contained in the
late-arriving document changed your view of the candidate?
definitely
did change
my view
definitely did
not change
my view
5) To what degree do you feel you should be held responsible for
the ranking of the candidate you made before receiving the missing
document?
definitely
should be
held re-
sponsible
definitely
should not be
held re-
sponsible
6) To what degree do you feel that the writer of the document was
unbaised in his evaluation of the candidate?
definitely
unbaised
definitely
biased
7) 'What degree of importance do you think should be given to the
information in the document?
a very high
degree of
importance
not a very high
degree of
importance
8) To what degree do you feel that you did know the information
contained in the late letter of recommendation after you first
examined the candidate's folder?
definitely did
not know the
information
definitely did
know the : : : ' '• '• : :_
information
Questionnaire 3 • .
1) How -likely is it that the experimenter (George Whitehead) will
allow you to change your rankings of the candidates at a later
time?
very likely not very likely
2) At the time you ranked the candidates, how confident were you
that your ranking was a good one?
very
confident
not very
confident

